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UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS AND No CITATION
RULES IN THE TRIAL COURTS
J. THOMAS SULLIVAN"

INTRODUCTION
Appellate judges and commentators have been engaged in an increasingly
pointed debate over the practice of designating some appellate opinions as not to
be published and the effects of prohibiting or restricting reliance on unpublished
opinions in litigation. The debate has intensified because "unpublished"
opinions-that is, opinions not included in the official or unofficial reports-are
often readily available through online databases, such as judicial websites, private
providers such as Westlaw and LEXIS, and public alternatives such as Findlaw.
The simple fact is that "no citation" rules often unfairly compromise counsel's
ability to effectively represent a client, whether at trial or on appeal.
Much of the debate over publication and citation restrictions has focused
on the position espoused by the late Eighth Circuit Judge, Richard S. Arnold, in his
published essay, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment,' and later in the panel
Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law;
founding editor, The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process. Copyright, 2004, by the
Author. This Article draws heavily on the research of Melissa Serfass and Jessie Cranford,
Professors of Law Librarianship at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law
originally published in The Journal:Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication
and Citation of Opinions, 3 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 251 (2001) and their article updating
their original research, Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publicationand Citation
of Opinions, 6 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 349 (2005) and two articles published in The
Journal by Professor Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West's Federal
Appendix: The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS I
(2002), and No Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis, 5 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 471 (2003). These works reflect major research efforts beyond the scope
of this article and the author respectfully defers to them with respect to the current status of
publication and citation rules in the United States. The focus of this article is directed to the
less certain status, in fact, of unpublished opinions and enforcement of no citation rules in
those jurisdictions limiting reliance on unpublished opinions. The author assumes
responsibility for any errors in interpretation of the data provided by Professors Barnett,
Serfass and Cranford. I would also like to thank Professors Theresa Beiner and Erica
Beecher-Monas; Terri for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this article, and
Erica for several years of collegiality and friendship while on the UALR faculty as she
begins her new career at Wayne State in the fall of 2005.
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decision he wrote in Anastasoff v. United States.2 In his essay, Judge Arnold
questioned whether a prohibition on citing unpublished opinions could be
reconciled with the judicial power conferred on the federal courts by Article Ill of
the Constitution.3 His opinion for the panel in Anastasoff used his Article Ill
argument as a basis for the decision, but the en banc Eighth Circuit vacated the
panel's decision as moot, leaving the ultimate disposition of this issue in the
Eighth Circuit unresolved.4

Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, I J. APP. PRAc. &
219 (1999).
2.
223 F.3d 898, vacated as moot 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
3.
Arnold, supra note I, at 226. Article III of the United States Constitution
provides, in pertinent part:
Section 1. The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.
I.

PROCESS

Section 2. [1] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a party;-to Controversies between two
or more States;-between a State and citizens of another State;between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
[2] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court
shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned,
the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.
U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1-2.
4.
235 F.3d 1054, vacating 223 F.3d 898.
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5
The continuing attention paid to publication and no citation rules
demonstrates the philosophical and practical importance attached to decisions by
appellate courts that essentially rank their work product in terms of importance in
future litigation. But the debate has virtually ignored another important
constituency-trial judges and trial lawyers-that may be impacted by operation
of the no citation rules and the practice of not designating some opinions for
publication. Both trial judges and trial lawyers must make important decisions in
the course of litigation based on assessments of the current and future state of the
law. Unlike appellate counsel and judges, both of whom typically have time to
reflect on the accuracy of appellate decisionmaking, trial lawyers and courts often
have less opportunity for reflection, 7 particularly when issues arise in the context
ofjury trials. 8

See, e.g., Anastasoff, Unpublished Opinions and "No Citation" Rules, 3 J.
5.
App. PRAC. & PROCESS 169-451 (2001) (including eleven essays and articles addressing the
issues of publication and prohibitions on citation of unpublished opinions). The initial
debate is cogently summed up by Professor Stephen R. Barnett in his essay, From
Anastasoff to Hart to West's Federal Appendix: The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation
Rules. 4 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 1 (2002). Professor Barnett noted that recent
developments included a formal recommendation from the ABA House of Delegates
condemning rules in some federal circuits prohibiting citation to unpublished opinions; the
development of the FederalAppendix by West Publishing Company as a formal vehicle for
publication of unpublished opinions; abandonment of citation limitation by the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; and the adoption of a new rule by the Texas
Supreme Court eliminating the no citation restriction from previously unpublished opinions.
Id. at 2-7 nn.4, 6, 11, 29. Professor Barnett has updated the continuing discussion in a
recent issue of the Journal. Stephen R. Barnett, No Citation Rules UnderSiege: A Battlefield
Report and Analysis, 5 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 471 (2003) [hereinafter Barnett, Battlefield
Report].
The judicial and academic debate following Judge Arnold's dual attack on no
6.
citation proscriptions has been substantial, including discussion in direct response by a
panel of the Ninth Circuit. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
Article III theory for elimination of no citation rules); see also Alex Kosinki & Stephen
Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This!: Why We Don't Allow Citation to Unpublished
Dispositions, CAL. LAW., June 2000, 43. On the state level, an extensive discussion of
publication practice and no citation rules was advanced by Justice Acoba of the Hawaii
Supreme Court as Appendix A in his concurrence in State v. Uyesugi. 60 P.3d 843, 874-82
(Haw. 2002). Justice Acoba noted:
Justice Ramil and I have agreed and will continue to agree to any
recommendation by any of the other justices to publish a case even if the
majority will not adhere to such a policy. We do so because we support
and respect the opinion of any one of our colleagues that a decision
warrants publication and that the views raised in the opinion should be
disseminated.
Id. at 875-76.
This does not suggest that trial court decisions are "immunized" for purposes
7.
of judicial review, and the abuse of discretion doctrine should not imply that legal errors
made by trial courts are not subject to correction through reversal on appeal. See, e.g.,
Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151-53 (Wyo. 1998) (explaining doctrine of abuse of
discretion and its proper application in review of trial court decisions based on totality of
circumstances test, rather than simply deciding that the trial court did not err in denying
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I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF CITATION/No CITATION RULES
Jurisdictions are split on the question of whether unpublished opinions
may be cited by parties or other court panels as precedent or persuasive authority
when similar issues arise. This Article addresses the use of unpublished decisions
at the trial court level.
A. The Changing Landscapeof Citation/No citation Rules in the States

Virtually all jurisdictions have addressed the use of unpublished opinions
by judicial opinion, by statute, 9 or by rule. If there is a discernible trend in the
approaches taken by courts toward the use of no citation rules, it is in the direction
of relaxation of citation prohibitions at both the state and federal levels. Professors
Serfass and Cranford, in their survey of publication and citation rules, report that
over the past four years, the First Circuit and the D.C. Circuit, Alaska, Iowa,
Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia have all liberalized
their rules to permit attorneys to cite unpublished opinions, either as precedential
or persuasive authority. 10
In many jurisdictions, however, the proscription against use of
unpublished opinions remains firm. For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court has
expressed the rule in simple and direct terms: "Unpublished opinions shall not be
cited or used as authority in any other case in any court of this state."" The Florida
Supreme Court articulated a similar approach by published opinion: per curiam
affirmances without written opinion have no precedential value and should not be
cited.' 2 In some jurisdictions, the rationale underlying the prohibition is clearly
articulated. For example, in formal rulemaking the Wisconsin Supreme Court
continuance in probation revocation proceeding to permit adjudication on underlying
charged offense).
8.
See Martha S. Davis, Standardsof Review: JudicialReview of Discretionary
Decisionmaking, 2 J.App. PRAC. & PROCESs 47, 55-56 (2000) (noting Professor Maurice
Rosenberg's observation that one reason for conferring discretion on the trial court is its
"superiority' in being on the spot"); see also, e.g., State v. Lloyd, 345 N.W.2d 240, 246
(Minn. 1984) (holding that on appeal, a ruling on the admissibility of prior criminal
convictions for purposes of impeachment is upheld if the trial court's ruling is within that
court's substantial range of discretion).
9.
See MINN. STAT. § 480A.08 3(b), (c) (1996) (providing unpublished opinions
"must not be cited as precedent, except as law of the case, res judicata or collateral
estoppel" and that "[u]npublished opinions of the court of appeals are not precedential.").
See Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 801 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) ("The
legislature has unequivocally provided that unpublished opinions are not precedential.").
Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie Wallace Cranford, Federal and State Court
10.
Rules Governing Publicationand Citationof Opinions, 6 J.APp. PRAC. & PROCESs 349, 349
(2005) (updating their original 2001 research); see also Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie
Wallace Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication and Citation of
Opinions, 3 J.App.PRAC. & PROCESS 251 (2001).
11.
Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.28(4)(c).
12.
Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Dist. Ct. of App., Fifth Cir., 434 So. 2d 310, 312
(Fla. 1983). The court's directive reflects an important distinction between dispositions that
offer a supporting rationale-an opinion-and summary orders that do not include an
explanation for the appellate court's determination.
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rejected a motion by the State Bar of Wisconsin to permit citation to unpublished
opinions for "persuasive and informational purposes."' 3 The court noted that
allowing practitioners to rely on unpublished opinions would compound the
14
burdens and costs of legal research necessary for effective client representation.
The court concluded that the potential prejudice caused by disparate access to
unpublished opinions warranted their exclusion at the trial court level. The court
explained:
[I]f citation of unpublished opinions were permitted for persuasive
and informational purposes, the inequality between persons
knowing of unpublished opinions and those who did not would exist
well before a matter reached the courts. Indeed, it would be present
at the outset of5legal representation, even in matters never intended
to be litigated.'
The court also feared that trial courts would "unwittingly give unpublished
opinions more weight than that to which they are entitled, merely because they
express the reasoning of an appellate tribunal on the same or similar issue."' 6 This
observation is important because it suggests a misuse of unpublished opinions that
should not17 be possible if, indeed, these opinions are truly without value as
precedent.
13.
In re Amendment of Section (Rule) 809.23(3), Stats., 456 N.W.2d 783, 783
(Wis. 1990). California also prohibits reliance on unpublished opinions in the state's courts.
In re John D., 178 Cal. Rptr. 278, 280 (Ct. App. 1981) ("There is no question that the citing
of unpublished Court of Appeal opinions is contrary to rule 977."). The appellant argued
that he was denied a fair hearing because of the trial court's reliance on an unpublished
court of appeals opinion. Id. at 279. The court concluded that the trial court's reliance on the
depublished opinion had been "inadvertent yet erroneous," resulting in no prejudice to the
appellant because the trial court's ruling was correct. Id. at 281. This opinion was also
ordered "depublished" on February 24, 1982, pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 976.
The California rule has been subject to review over the past few years. See J. CLARK KELSO
& JOSHUA WEINSTEIN, APPELLATE PROCESs TASK FORCE,

A

WHITE PAPER ON UNPUBLISHED

(2001), at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/
documents/unpub.pdf. (last visited Nov. 26, 2004). The Task Force recommended that
"[u]npublished opinions should be posted on the Judicial Council's Web site for a
reasonable period of time (e.g., 60 days), but the general proscription against citation of
unpublished opinions (i.e., rule 977) should remain in place without change." Id. at 4.
OPINIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEAL

14.

In re Amendment of Section 809.23(3) at 784. "This additional burden on the

practitioner, with a concomitant increase in fees to the client, would not be alleviated by the
availability of services printing the unpublished appellate opinions or their inclusion in
automated legal research tools or availability at law libraries. All law offices are not created
equal: differences in geographical location, client base and economic resources create an
inequality in the ability of a practitioner, whether a lawyer practicing alone in a small town
or one practicing in a 35-member firm in a large metropolis, to easily and affordably
conduct the research needed for adequate client representation." Id.
Id. at 783.
15.
16.
Id. at 784.
17.
Justice Abrahamson dissented. Id. at 78 (Abrahamson, I., dissenting). He
argued that many unpublished opinions are not, in fact, without legal significance and may
be important in advancing new propositions of law or offering guidance on novel
applications of existing law. Id. at 787 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (citing WALTHER,
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The New Mexico citation prohibition includes a rationale similar to
Wisconsin's. The rule states: "An order, decision, or memorandum opinion,
because it is unreported and not uniformly available to all parties, shall not be
published nor shall it be cited as precedent in any court."' 18 Although New Mexico
and Wisconsin seek to further the same equitable policy, New Mexico's no citation
rule appears less restrictive. Because of the ambiguity in the term "precedent," a
court could interpret the statute to prohibit the use of unpublished opinions as
binding or controlling precedent, while permitting reliance on unpublished
opinions for "persuasive value."' 9 In State v. Gonzales, the court failed to enforce
the prohibition and effectively permitted counsel to rely on an unpublished opinion
while suggesting that the better approach would be to advance the reasoning in the
unpublished opinion without attributing it to its source.20 Similarly, Alaska, when
considering a citation to an unpublished concurrence that arguably violated
Alaska's rule, 21 declined to impose sanctions because counsel did not rely on the
prior decision as binding precedent, but merely as "authority. '22 New Hampshire's
rule addresses this by prohibiting citation to summary unpublished dispositions as
precedent or authority.3
A survey of state court rules indicates that no citation rules, when applied
to unpublished opinions, typically apply to all courts in that jurisdiction, including
trial courts. 24 The rules may be explicit, like Tennessee's rules governing the

(1986)
and Donald R. Songer, Criteriafor Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals:
Formal Rules versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307 (1990)). See generally Mia
Sefarbi & Kira Zaporski, Citing Unpublished Opinions in Wisconsin State and Federal
Tribunals, WIsC. LAW., Nov. 2004, available at www.wisbar.org/wislawmag/
2004/1 I/Sefarbi.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2004) (updating the continuing issue of citation
of unpublished opinions in Wisconsin courts).
18.
N.M. R. APP. P. 12-405(C) (emphasis added). Other courts have expressed a
similar concern that unpublished opinions are not equally accessible to all parties. See
Steiner Corp. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 979 P.2d 357, 362 n.9 (Ut. 1999)
("A primary purpose of rule 4-508 is to assure that all persons have access to court
decisions that state the law. Only a very limited group of people have access to unpublished
decisions. Clearly Steiner, as a party to the district court decision, had access to and
knowledge of that decision."). Utah has changed its policy to permit citation to unpublished
opinions. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
19.
See State v. Gonzales, 794 P.2d 361, 370-71 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
20.
Id.
21.
ALASKA R. APP. P. 214(d) ("Summary decisions under this rule are without
precedential effect and may not be cited in the courts of this state.").
22.
McCoy v. State, 80 P.3d 751, 753 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002), republished from
59 P.3d 747 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). The court concluded:
McCoy's attorney did not claim or imply that our unpublished decision
in Westerlin resolved the issue of statutory interpretation presented in
McCoy's case or that it restricted the scope of Judge Brown's decisionmaking authority on this issue. Thus, the defense attorney did not violate
Appellate Rule 214(d) by bringing Westerlin to Judge Brown's attention.
Id.
23.
N.H. SuP. CT. R. 25(5).
24.
See Serfass & Cranford, supra note 10, at 358-94.
GROVE AND HEFFERMAN, APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN WISCONSIN 17-4
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citation of unpublished opinions, 25 or quite general, like the Montana Supreme
Court's Internal Operating Rule prohibiting citation of"noncitable" opinions. 6
No citation rules may limit or bar the application of unpublished opinions
to other parties, cases, and controversies, but these rules do not impair the binding
effects that unpublished decisions have on the original litigants. Therefore, these
rules generally allow the use of unpublished opinions for res judicata, the
27 law of
the case doctrine, collateral estoppel, procedural bar, and double jeopardy.
Not all jurisdictions proscribe reliance on unpublished decisions. New
York has not addressed the issue by rule or judicial opinion but appears to take a
lenient stance on the issue.2 8 Delaware29 and Michigan30 both allow reliance on
TENN. R. SUP. CT. 4(F)(I)-(2). The rule provides:
(F)(1) If an application for permission to appeal is hereafter denied by
this Court with a "Not for Citation" designation, the opinion of the
intermediate appellate court has no precedential value.
(2) An opinion so designated shall not be published in any official
reporter nor cited by any judge in any trial or appellate court decision, or
by any litigant in any brief, or other material presented to any court,
except when the opinion is the basis for a claim of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, law of the case, or to establish a split of authority, or when the
opinion is relevant to a criminal, post-conviction or habeas corpus action
involving the same defendant.
(3) From and after the effective date of this Rule, the precedential and
citation value applicable to intermediate appellate court decisions
designated "Not for Citation," shall also apply to intermediate appellate
court decisions which have previously been designated, "Denied,
Concurring in Results Only" (DCRO), or "Denied, Not for Publication,"
(DNP).
(G) If no application for permission to appeal is filed, or if an
application is filed but dismissed as untimely, publication of the
intermediate appellate court opinion shall proceed in accordance with
either Court of Appeals Rule I I or Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 19.
(H)(1) An unpublished opinion shall be considered controlling authority
between the parties to the case when relevant under the doctrines of the
law of the case, res judicata, collateral estoppel, or in a criminal, postconviction, or habeas corpus action involving the same defendant.
Unless designated "Not For Citation," "DCRO" or "DNP" pursuant to
subsection (F) of this Rule, unpublished opinions for all other purposes
shall be considered persuasive authority. Unpublished opinions of the
Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel shall likewise be
considered persuasive authority.
Id. (emphasis added).
26.
MONT. SUP. CT. INTERNAL Op. R. § I(3)(c).
25.

27.

See, e.g., ALA. R. APP. P 53(d), 54(d).

28.
Serfass & Cranford, supra note 10, at 380 n.27. One New York court has
pointed out that unreported decisions may be "entitled to respectful consideration, [but] are
not binding [as] precedent upon this court." Eaton v. Chahal, 553 N.Y.S.2d 642, 646
(1990).
DEL. SUp. CT. R. 14(b)(vi)(4).
29.
MICH. CT. R. 7.215(C) (noting an unpublished opinion is "not binding
30.
precedent").
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unpublished opinions but require disclosure to opposing counsel before using them
in court. In Ohio, "[aill court of appeals opinions issued after [May 2002] may be
cited as legal authority and weighted as deemed appropriate by the courts. '' 3'
The Utah Supreme Court struck down a no citation rule, holding that all
decisions of the court of appeals are binding upon lower courts and may be relied
upon by parties to the extent that they "are useful, authoritative[,] and
persuasive[]. 32 Utah has procedural rules that may help determine how
unpublished decisions can be used. The rules of appellate procedure 33 and criminal
procedure both permit attorneys to cite unpublished opinions, with the former
expressly authorizing their citation as precedent.34 But the rules of appellate
procedure also recognize a class of decisions resulting from expedited appeals in
which the decision is not treated as precedent.35 The rules suggest applying
standards for characterizing cases similar to those that differentiate cases meriting
publication from those that do not. 36 Despite the rules to assist in characterization,
appellate courts may erroneously designate valuable court opinions as nonprecedential expedited appeals. However, any harm caused by misdesignation
could be mitigated as long as these expedited appeals retain their persuasive value.
The Oklahoma rule applicable in criminal cases addresses the use of
unpublished opinions in perhaps the most pragmatic fashion, providing that "[i]n
all instances, an unpublished opinion is not binding on this Court. However,
parties may cite and bring to the Court's attention the unpublished opinions of this
Court provided counsel states that no published case would serve as well the
purpose for which counsel cites it....,3 This approach realistically addresses the
prospect that an unpublished opinion will actually prove to be the best expression

31.
OHIO SUP. CT. R. 4. The prior language of the rule had provided "inother
situations, such opinions shall be considered persuasive authority." OHIO SuP. CT. R. 2(G).
32.
Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P.3d 734, 738 (Utah 2002). Under the prior rule,
prohibiting citation, Utah courts refused to consider unpublished opinions as having
precedential value. See State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136, 1139 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
("The State improperly directs us to our unpublished decision in Elwood v. Holden, Case
No. 890609-CA (Utah App. March 21, 1990). Unpublished decisions have no precedential
value and cannot be cited or used except for the purposes of applying the doctrine of the law
of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
R4-605.").
33.
UTAH R. APP. P. 30(f) (providing "[u]npublished decisions may be cited").
34.

UTAH R. CRIM. P. 37 (providing "[u]npublished decisions may be cited as

precedent").
35.
UTAH R. APP. P 31(f) (providing that "[a]ppeals decided under this rule will
not stand as precedent, but, in other respects, will have the same force and effect as other
decisions of the court").
36.
UTAH R. APP. P. 3 1(b), (d). Types of cases qualifying for expedited decision
without opinion include appeals involving uncomplicated factual issues primarily based on
documents; summary judgments; dismissals for failure to state a claim or lack of
jurisdiction; and cases based on uncomplicated issues of law. Subsection (d) provides that
an expedited appeal will not be granted when a case raises a substantial constitutional issue,
an issue of significant public interest, an issue of first impression, or a complicated issue of
fact or law. Id.
37.

OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. R. 3.5(C)(3).
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of a rule or application of a rule in a particular factual context, even though the
issuing panel did not foresee its significance at the time of decision.3 8 The
applicable Iowa rule similarly permits citation to an unpublished opinion, while
requiring counsel to perform a diligent search and disclose any "subsequent
disposition of the unpublished opinion. 39
Professor Stephen Barnett's review of the emerging trend in no citation
rules suggests that absolute prohibition-excepting for purposes of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or law of the case doctrines-remains intact in only twenty-five
jurisdictions.4 Barnett concludes that four states do not have any rules prohibiting
41
citations to unpublished opinions, five expressly permit its use as precedent, 42
and twelve more adopt the position that the opinions may be cited for their
persuasive value.43 He also concludes that five states appear to be "on the fence" at
present."
38.
Similarly, the applicable Kansas rule provides: Unpublished opinions "are
not favored for citation. But unpublished memorandum opinions may be cited if they have
persuasive value with respect to a material issue not addressed in a published opinion of a
Kansas appellate court and they would assist the court in its disposition." KAN. SUP. CT.R.
7.04(f)(2)(ii).
IOWA CT. R. APP. P. 6.14(5)(b). The rule provides:
39.
An unpublished opinion of the Iowa appellate courts or of any other
appellate court may be cited in a brief; however, unpublished opinions
shall not constitute controlling legal authority. A copy of the unpublished
opinion shall be attached to the brief and shall be accompanied by a
certification that counsel has conducted a diligent search for, and fully
disclosed, any subsequent disposition of the unpublished opinion. For
purposes of these rules, an "unpublished" opinion means an opinion the
text of which is not included or designated for inclusion in the National
Reporter System. When citing an unpublished appellate opinion, a party
shall include, when available, an electronic citation indicating where the
opinion may be readily accessed on line.
Id.
The Iowa court noted the change in the rule from a former absolute prohibition in State
v. Averhoff. No. 01-194, 2002 WL 100573, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002) ("The State
also argues the district court erred in relying on an unpublished decision of our court. We
note that Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 14(e) was recently amended to allow the
citation of unpublished decisions. Because we reverse the district court's ruling on other
grounds, we need not address this argument.").
Barnett, BattlefieldReport, supra note 5, at 484-86.
40.
41.
Id. at 481 (identifying Connecticut, Mississippi, New York, and North
Dakota).
42.
Id. at 481 (identifying Delaware, Ohio, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia). See
also Serfass & Cranford, supra note 10.
43.
Id. (identifying Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, New Mexico, Tennessee,
Vermont, Wyoming, Virginia, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Georgia).
Id.at 481, 483. At the time of his article, published in 2003, Professor
44.
Barnett concluded that Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Oklahoma and Oregon were considering
modification of citation prohibitions and too close to call in terms of the likelihood of
change being adopted. Id.Professors Serfass and Cranford, in their 2005 survey, note that
both Hawaii and Illinois have tabled proposals for change at the present time. Serfass &
Cranford, supra note 10, at 349-50 nn.2, 5.
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Absent a proscription on the use of unpublished decisions, it appears that
trial counsel and trial courts can hardly be precluded from attempting to rely on
unpublished opinions in support of arguments or rulings. Even when the
jurisdiction expressly rejects the use of unpublished decisions, counsel is placed in
an awkward position when such a decision supports the client's position.45 Once
counsel knows of the existence of a favorable decision on point, the restraint
required for compliance with the no citation rule may be unreasonable.46
In a thorough and thoughtful discussion of the continuing problem, the
Alaska Court of Appeals, in McCoy v. State47, interpreted its rule to permit the use

of unpublished opinions as persuasive authority. On rehearing, Judge Mannheimer
surveyed the status of no citation rules among the circuits and states and noted the
problems leading to relaxation of the prohibition.4 8 He observed that the court
itself in John v. State had been forced to "address (and reverse) a twelve-year old
unpublished opinion" that the court "had forgotten about., 49 He further noted that
courts in Mississippi, 50 Alabama, 5 1 Georgia, 52 and Missouri 53 had permitted

citation to unpublished decisions or those courts had discussed their rationales
without expressly ruling on their precedential value. Judge Mannheimer found that
policies favoring no citation rules are subject to widespread reconsideration,
particularly in light of criticism that the practice may result in "inconsistent or
even irreconcilable decisions. 5 4 The Alaska court concluded that its appellate
rules were designed to promote reading and discussion of unpublished opinions 55

45.
For example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals addressed the problem of
unauthorized citation to unpublished decisions in Yocom v. Justice, noting that the trial court
had relied on an unpublished decision of the state supreme court and that counsel had
attached a copy of the memorandum opinion as an Appendix to its formal pleadings. 569
S.W.2d 678, 678-79 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). The court declined to order the pleading struck
and permitted refiling in conformity with the publication rule, but noted the widespread
practice of relying on unpublished opinions. It used the opinion to warn counsel that in the
future, non-conforming pleadings would be struck with leave to refile denied. Id.
46.
Some courts recognize the inherent conflict facing counsel. See, e.g., Jones v.
Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972) ("We concede, of
course, that any decision is by definition a precedent, and that we cannot deny litigants and
the bar the right to urge upon us what we have previously done.").
47.
80 P.3d 757 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
48.

Id. at 759-63.

49.
Id. at 758 (discussing John v. State, 35 P.3d 53, 65 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001)).
The "forgotten" unpublished decision was Wilson v. State, Memorandum Opinion No. 1893
(October I1, 1989).
50.
McBride v. Jones, 803 So. 2d 1168, 1171 (Miss. 2002) (McRae, J.,
dissenting).
51.
Whitt v. State, 827 So. 2d 869, 877 n.2 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002).
52.
Hammond v. State, 398 S.E.2d 168, 174 (Ga. 1990).
53.
State v. Gonzales, 63 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
54.
McCoy, 80 P.3d at 763.
55.
Id. at 763-64 (reconciling no citation rule, ALASKA APP. R. 214, with Alaska
Court of Appeals Standing Order 3, Para. 6 that provided for distribution of all unpublished
decision of Court of Appeals to state trial judges and to members of the public, upon
request).
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and that counsel should be permitted to cite
those opinions for their persuasive
56
value, although not as controlling precedent.
B. The Federal Landscape
On the federal level, the majority of the circuits now permit citation to
unpublished opinions.57 The post-Anastasoff controversy over the proper uses of
unpublished opinions and citation prohibitions ultimately led to a proposed
revision of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 32.1.5 The proposed
revision would permit the use of unpublished opinions:
(a) Citation Permitted. No prohibition or restriction may be imposed
upon the citation of judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other
written dispositions that have been designated as "unpublished,"
"not for publication," "non-precedential," "not precedent," or the
like, unless that prohibition or restriction is generally imposed upon
the citation of all judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other
written dispositions.
(b) Copies Required. A party who cites a judicial opinion, order,
judgment, or other written disposition that is not available in a
publicly accessible electronic database must file and serve a copy of
that opinion, order, judgment, or other written disposition with the
brief or other paper in which it is cited.5 9
The proposed rule would provide a uniform approach to reliance on unpublished
opinions, while not necessarily requiring uniformity in terms of weight to be
accorded those decisions. Professor Barnett argues that the language of the
proposed revision is imprecise and subject to conflicting interpretations, but
suggests that some latitude in the way in which unpublished opinions are treated is
justified in light of the fact that the panel issuing the opinion itself has determined
that the disposition did not warrant "publication." He notes, to the point,
"[u]npublished opinions are different from published ones. ' 60

56.
Id. at 764.
57.
Barnett, Battlefield Report, supra note 5, at 474-76. ("The circuits permitting
citation are the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.
Those still forbidding citation are the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal Circuits. Nine of
thirteen is a substantial majority; citability of unpublished opinions thus comes close to
being the norm in the federal circuits today." (citations omitted)). For a summary of
provisions governing citation of unpublished decisions in the federal circuit courts of
appeals, see Table I in Serfass & Cranford, supra note 10, at 351-57.
58.
See generally Barnett, Battlefield Report, supra note 5, at 487-89 (offering a
history of the proposed revision); Anne Coyle, Note, A Modest Reform: The New Rule 32.1
Permitting Citation to Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 72
FoRDHAm L. REV. 2471, 2590-91 (2004) (arguing for adoption of proposed rule).
59.
See Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm.
on App. Rules, to Judge Anthony A. Scirica, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Pract. &
Proc. 28-29 (May 22, 2003) at http:// www.uscourts.gov/rules/appO803.pdf
60.
Barnett, Battlefield Report, supra note 5, at 496.
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Perhaps reflecting on the intense debate 6 1 over "nationalization" of an
approach recognizing unpublished opinions as generally "citable," the Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure took no action on the proposed amended Rule
32.1. Instead, the Committee referred62the matter to the Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules for additional review.
As the extended discussion of the current state of no citation rules in
McCoy suggests, the existence of such rules presents problems for both appellate
courts and counsel practicing before them. Moreover, the trend toward permitting
citation to unpublished opinions for their precedential or persuasive value suggests
nothing less than that ethical concerns involving research and disclosure must now
be considered in light of the changing landscape of acceptable citation and
argument practice. The ethical issues posed by this situation are not always easily
resolved using the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.

II. APPLICATION OF ETHICAL RULES AND CONCEPTS TO THE USE
OF UNPUBLISHED AUTHORITY
For practitioners, the national trend toward permitting citation to
unpublished decisions is less theoretical and more practical. Counsel must be alert
to changes in jurisdiction policy, of course, because a shift toward liberalization or
restriction of citation implicitly indicates not only a change in practice, but also a
change in the jurisdiction's attitude toward its case law. For trial judges and
counsel, the two almost necessarily merge because liberalization or abandonment
of no citation rules opens the door to using all available appellate opinions in the
trial court. However, until all distinctions between published and unpublished
opinions are abandoned, counsel must be concerned with two different ethical
dilemmas that may arise in representing their clients.
The first problem involves the specific dictates of the Rules of
Professional Responsibility within the jurisdiction, while the second problem
involves the need to protect the client's interests when unpublished authority offers
the greatest potential support for the client's position.
A. Application of Ethical Rules to Citation of Unpublished Authority
1. Counsel's Duty Not to Cite UnpublishedA uthority
When a jurisdiction has declared its unpublished opinions unavailable for
use in litigation, counsel's ethical duty appears clear--do not violate the

61.

E.g., Tony Mauro, Green Light to Cite Unpublished Opinions, LEGAL

TIMES

April 19, 2004 (noting "barrage of opposition from hundreds of federal judges and
lawyers"), available at www.law.com. (last visited Dec. 16, 2004); Press Release, Admin.
Office of the U.S. Courts, Congress/Courts Study Use of Unpublished Opinions (June 27,
2002), available at www.uscourtsgov/PressReleases/unpub.html (last visited Dec. 14,
2004) (quoting United States District Judge Samuel Alito testimony before a congressional
committee noting that "difficult issues" require study of use of unpublished opinions on
"several levels").
62.

U.S.

COURTS,

ADVISORY

RULES COMMITTEE

ACTIONS

http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/index.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
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controlling rule within the jurisdiction. Violations of ethical rules may result in
official sanction. Problems arise when counsel has knowledge of an unpublished
decision that supports the client's position, particularly in the absence of a
published decision. The court may directly sanction counsel for relying on the
unpublished opinion63 or require counsel to refile without referencing the
unpublished decisions.64
Sanctioning counsel for relying on an unpublished opinion is a harsh
penalty to impose on counsel for seeking to inform the court of another court's
view of an issue, rather than for attempting to misuse authority or misrepresent a
fact to the court. In Lam v. Ngo,65 the California Court of Appeals addressed the
sanction a lower court imposed on an attorney who cited an unpublished federal
district court opinion in a state court pleading in violation of California's Rule 977,
which prohibits attorneys from citing unpublished opinions. 66 The appellate court
first noted that counsel's punishment was ironic because the rule had been
amended to restrict citation only with regard to unpublished state court opinions,
67
whereas here the attorney cited an unpublished federal district court opinion. The
court also observed that the opinion was eventually published in the Federal
Supplement. Finally, the court stressed that the prohibition had been imposed to
"relieve" counsel of the duty to research and cite unpublished opinions because of
68
the burden resulting from having to read additional cases. The problem with
assigning blame to counsel may well lie in determining exactly what motivated
counsel to cite the prohibited authority, especially if the no citation rule is not
69
sufficiently precise, as the Alaska court's handling of McCoy v. State suggests.
There, the McCoy court concluded that counsel had not argued that the prior
See, e.g., Mann v. Hobbick, No. 49233-1-1, 2002 WL 1402546, at *3 (Wash.
63.
Ct. App. July I, 2002) (fining counsel for violating no citation rule, WASH. APP. R. 10.4(h));
Kislak Mortgage Corp., 13 P.3d 240, 244 (Wash. Ct App. 2000) (imposing
Dwyer v. J.1.
five-hundred dollars in sanctions against counsel for citing and discussing "at length" an
unpublished opinion issued by same appellate court). But when a Washington attorney cited
an unpublished opinion from another jurisdiction, the appellate court declined to sanction
because of ambiguity in the no citation rule suggesting that only unpublished opinions of
the Washington Court of Appeals could not be cited. Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc.,
45 P.3d 594, 608-09 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). A similar anomaly was noted by Judge Arnold
in his essay Unpublished Opinions, and by Judge Mannheimer in McCoy. Appellate courts
also may elect not to sanction counsel, other than by mentioning the impropriety. See
Swanigan v. State, No. CACR 02-1093, 2003 WL 21278011, at *2 (Ark. Ct. App. June 4,
2003) (observing that counsel submitted "as precedent, an unpublished Arkansas Court of
Appeals case," and noting "[C]itation to unpublished opinions is prohibited by Ark. Sup. Ct.
R. 5-2(d) (2002)").
See Yocom v. Justice, 569 S.W.2d 678, 678-79 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
64.
111 Cal.Rptr. 582, 588-89 (Cal Ct. App. 2001).
65.
Id. at 589 n.5.
66.
Id. (stating that the opinion "wasn't 'unpublished' after all, though it had
67.
existed only in cyberspace at the time of the hearing on the preliminary injunction").
Id. ("The irony here is that footnote 34 was written to relieve courts and
68.
counsel from having to worry about the continuously growing legions of unpublished cases,
not to add another trap for the unwary practitioner." (emphasis original)).
McCoy v. State, 80 P.3d 751, 753 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002), republishedfrom
69.
59 P.3d 747 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
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unpublished opinion was binding precedent, but merely advanced it as supporting
argument. 70
The ethical quandary faced by counsel having access to a favorable
unpublished opinion is not hypothetical. Consider the situation created by the
Texas Court of Appeals decision not to publish its per curiam reversal in Flanigan
v. State. 7 1 The court addressed a number of ineffective assistance claims directed at
trial counsel in the direct appeal, a somewhat unusual circumstance because these
claims are typically raised in post-conviction proceedings.72 But the appellant had
raised numerous claims of ineffectiveness in his motion for new trial, supported
with affidavits from trial counsel,
73 and another attorney offered an expert opinion
on trial counsel's performance.
While the Flanigan court rejected most of the claims of deficient
performance, it was convinced that two merited relief Trial counsel had failed to
request a limiting instruction on the jury's consideration of evidence that the
defendant and codefendant used crack cocaine before committing the aggravated
robbery of which Flanigan was convicted. The court noted that Texas law required
such an instruction 74 and concluded that counsel's failure to request the limiting
instruction undermined confidence in the verdict. 75 Because the published opinion
relied on by the Flanigan court is generally available for citation by counsel, the
disposition of this point in the unpublished per curiam opinion is not particularly
significant.
But the appellate court also concluded that in this closely contested trial,
counsel's error in making his directed verdict motion in the presence of the jury
also constituted deficient performance requiring reversal.76 The court noted the
likely tendency of jurors to consider the trial court's denial of the motion
challenging sufficiency of the evidence as an improper comment on its weight by
the trial judge.77 The per curiam opinion cites no Texas authority on this point.78
This unpublished decision may essentially become the most important appellate
opinion on the ineffectiveness claim when trial counsel commits the same error.
Yet the unpublished opinion in Flanigan cannot be properly relied on in future
litigation because Texas continues to prohibit citation to unpublished opinions in
criminal cases.79

70.
Id.
71.
No. 09-97-474CR, 1999 WL 498184 (Tex. Crim. App. July 14, 1999).
72.
See Massaro v. United States, 583 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (noting the
desirability of raising ineffective assistance claims in post-conviction proceedings which
will typically permit the development of a full record).
73.

Flanigan, 1999 WL 498184, at *2.

Id. at *6 (citing Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex. Crim. App.
74.
1996)).
Id. at *7.
75.
Id. at *6. Counsel stated in his affidavit that he "did not think about having
76.
the jury removed." Id.
77.
Id. at *8.
78.
Id.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b), 77.3.
79.
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2. No Citation Rules and Competent Counsel
The Flanigansituation presents a dilemma for counsel who may need to
rely on its holding but cannot because the court of appeals decided not to publish
the opinion. Counsel in this situation must sacrifice the interests of the client in
order to comply with the rule of practice.80 For many lawyers, and perhaps many
trial courts, the rule should give way to the opportunity to support an argument
with the only authority that may be available.
Two provisions in the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility
demonstrate the problem when counsel is required to comply with a no citation
directive. First, the most general command in the ethical rules instructs counsel to
represent the client competently.81 Arguably, counsel cannot represent a client
competently by ignoring a controlling court rule and citing "uncitable" opinions.
But this view is simplistic because it ignores the likelihood that the client's interest
might well be furthered by disclosure to the trial or appellate court of decisions
that would support the client's position. The client in such a situation has no
interest in the suppression of the unpublished opinion. The no citation rule may
serve the interests of the judicial system or the courts, but it does not further the
interest of the individual client. Instead, the decision to employ a particular
procedural or evidentiary rule must be predicated on the general interests of the
judicial system in furthering the goal of fairness. Implicit in that decision is the
recognition that some individual litigants will end up in a disfavored position as a
result of the application of the rule, while others may benefit. This is perhaps a
cost of any system dependent upon generally applicable rules. While one can argue
that courts need generally applicable rules, it is difficult to blindly accept this
trade-off when clients are forced to endure the costs, tensions, and possible
negative results of litigation because the courts have placed a favorable expression
of law out of counsel's reach.
Even more compelling than the argument that counsel prohibited from
relying on unpublished opinions may be compromised in terms of offering
competent representation is the more specific ethical rule requiring counsel to
avoid advancing non-meritorious or frivolous claims or arguments. Rule 3.1
provides, in pertinent part that "[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding,
or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is

80.
Of course, counsel will always be limited by the operation of procedural or
evidential rules in representing the client. But with regard to those rules restricting the use
of unpublished opinions, the limitation is hardly based on any overarching need to control
the course of the proceedings in order to achieve ajust result. Instead, the prohibitions exist
principally to serve the interests of appellate judges concerned with the volume of litigation
and limited resources that require some cases to be dealt with in summary fashion. This
addresses the heart of Judge Arnold's argument that the courts cannot arbitrarily create a
body of law that is accessible but unusable in the primary context for which appellate
opinions are created, the resolution of legal questions arising inthe course of litigation.
81.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003) (providing that competent
representation requires the "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation necessary

for the representation").
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not frivolous, which includes82 a good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law.",
Suppose a lawyer arguing a novel position or application of existing rule
of law to the trial court finds that the only supporting authority in the jurisdiction is
an unpublished opinion8 3 For example, a Texas lawyer arguing an ineffective
assistance claim based on trial counsel's failure to have the jury removed prior to
arguing the directed verdict motion would find no Texas case other than Flanigan
supporting the point. Yet counsel would be precluded from relying on Flanigan
because it was not designated for publication. In order to demonstrate the good
faith basis for the claim that trial counsel's error constituted ineffective
representation, counsel should at least be permitted to alert the court to Flanigan.
Otherwise, the lawyer will almost certainly fail in her primary duty to the client: to
represent the client competently. If compliance with the rule prohibiting citation to
unpublished opinions results in trial error detrimental to the client's interests,
compliance with the no citation rule creates an actual conflict with the duty to
represent the client's interests competently. 84
B. Counsel's Duty to Research and Disclose Unpublished Authority
In evaluating the duty to research and disclose unpublished authority, the
most obvious starting point must be the approach taken toward unpublished
decisions by the appellate courts in the particular jurisdiction. Assuming that
unpublished decisions are not lesser authority because of their designation as not
for publication, the same ethical obligations appear to apply to counsel's duty to
research and disclose unpublished as well as published opinions. Thus, counsel
would presumably be expected to disclose unpublished authority, following the
Model Rule formulation: "A lawyer shall not knowingly ... fail to disclose to the
tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be
directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." 85
In fact, in terms of the unpublished opinion, counsel's disclosure duty may be
more significant precisely because opposing counsel does not have ready access to
the unpublished opinion.86 Because counsel cannot readily search unpublished

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3. 1.
83.
For instance, courts often reject arguments not supported by authority or
refuse to review them on appeal. See Buckley v. State, 76 S.W.3d 825, 833 n.3 (Ark. 2002);
Hollis v. State, 55 S.W.3d 756, 758 (Ark. 2001).
84.
The Eighth Circuit's local rule governing citation of unpublished opinions
provides a logical remedy for this situation. While discouraging reliance on unpublished
opinions, the rule also recognizes the situation in which there is no published opinion on
point: "Parties may also cite an unpublished opinion of this if the opinion has persuasive
value on a material issue and no published opinion of this or another court would serve as

82.

well .... U.S. CT. OF APP. 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i).
85.
MODEL R. OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3).

86.
Cf Rural Water System No. I v. City of Sioux Center, 967 F.Supp. 1483,
1498 n.2 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (noting counsel's access to a newly issued published decision as
central to the court's criticism of counsel's failure to cite applicable, but non-controlling,
authority). In Rural Water System, the court noted that counsel had represented a party in
the case not discussed in its motion for summary judgment. The court explained its views
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opinions in many jurisdictions, particularly those pre-dating online research,
unpublished opinions may effectively constitute a "lost" body of law known
exclusively to institutional litigants whose repeated litigation of issues may
87
produce a catalogued body of these decisions. An attorney general's office or an
on counsel's ethical obligation to apprise the court and opposing parties of contrary
authority:
It is hardly the issue that the rules of professional conduct require only
the disclosure of controlling authority, see, e.g., C.P.R. DR 7- 106(B)(1),
which the decision of a court of appeals in another circuit certainly is
not. In this court's view, the rules of professional conduct establish the
"floor" or "minimum" standards for professional conduct, not the
"ceiling"; basic notions of professionalism demand something higher.
Although the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is obviously
not controlling on this federal district court in the Eighth Circuit, RWS #
I's counsel's omission of the Scioto Water decision from RWS # I's
opening briefs smacks of concealment of obviously relevant and strongly
persuasive authority simply because it is contrary to RWS # I's position.
RWS # I's counsel did not hesitate to cite a decision of the Colorado
Supreme Court on comparable issues, although that decision is factually
distinguishable, probably because that decision appears to support RWS
# I's position. This selective citation of authorities, when so few
decisions are dead on point, is not good faith advocacy, or even
legitimate "hard ball." At best, it constitutes failure to confront and
distinguish or discredit contrary authority, and, at worst, constitutes an
attempt to hide from the court and opposing counsel a decision that is
adverse to RWS # I 's position simply because it is adverse.
Although the impact of RWS # I's counsel's omission, as a
practical matter, is slight, that is again hardly the issue. The issue, as the
court sees it, is one of professionalism. Similarly, hardly the issue is
RWS # I's counsel's rather self-serving assertion, when RWS # I's
briefing eventually addressed the Scioto Water decision, that that
decision should somehow be discounted, because it is "on appeal." The
decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is not "on appeal"; rather,
a petition for certiorari has been filed with, but not yet granted by, the
Supreme Court. See 65 U.S.L.W. 3666 (Mar. 18, 1997) (No. 96-1498).
This court does not believe that it is appropriate to disregard a decision
of a federal circuit court of appeals simply because one of the litigants
involved in the case in which the decision was rendered disagrees with
that decision. Rather, non-controlling decisions should be considered on
the strength of their reasoning and analysis, which is the manner in
which this court will consider the decisions of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in
Scioto Water and the Colorado Supreme Court in City of Grand Junction
v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 900 P.2d 81 (Colo.1995) (en banc).
RWS # I's counsel should have brought the Scioto Water decision to
this court's attention for consideration on that basis. Failure to cite
obscure authority that is on point through ignorance is one thing; failure
to cite authority that is on point and known to counsel, even if not
controlling, is quite another.
Id.(emphasis added).
See, e.g., Charles G. Mills, Anastasoff v. United States and Appeals in
87.
Veterans' Cases, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESs 419, 422-23 (2001) (explaining the

436

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 47:419

insurance defense firm representing clients in an ongoing and substantial number
of cases will likely have greater access to unpublished opinions than the solo
criminal practitioner or a plaintiffs attorney. If the larger office has taken the
opportunity to index these unpublished opinions, it will have created its own
database of judicial action, which may prove useful in fashioning future arguments
or in evaluating trends among appellate judges in the jurisdiction. Of course, these
offices have a duty of disclosure to opposing counsel of both published and
unpublished contrary authority in those jurisdictions in which the publication
status does not affect its use as precedent. 88
If the jurisdiction precludes citation to unpublished authority, trial
counsel's duty to disclose adverse authority depends on whether the jurisdiction
specifically precludes the use of unpublished opinions in trial courts as well as in
appellate litigation. If so, then neither side will likely be disadvantaged by the no
citation prohibition. But if counsel is not prohibited from relying on unpublished
opinions to support arguments before the trial court, then the potential
disadvantage to a party or counsel not having access to the full body of
unpublished decisions would seem to require a duty to disclose adverse authority.
This suggestion may be complicated by an additional factor. Suppose counsel
simply decides not to rely on favorable, unpublished opinions because there is a
conflict in the law of the unpublished opinions that would logically require
disclosure of the adverse expressions on the issue by the appellate courts. Does
counsel's decision not to venture into the body of unpublished decisions serve to
avoid a duty to disclose unpublished, unfavorable opinions on the issue before the
trial court?
In assessing the ethical duties that may arise for trial counsel, the most
important consideration may actually be the receptivity of trial judges to
unpublished opinions as supporting authority. But an equally important
consideration is whether counsel should risk failing to research or use unpublished
opinions if either the trial or appellate court will consider these potential sources of
authority in ruling. Declining to use these prior decisions in the absence of a rule
prohibiting their use might subject counsel to meritorious claims of negligence.
And in theory, the practice also would arguably8 9constitute an ethical violation by
depriving the client of competent representation.

government's advantage in knowledge of unpublished opinions in veteran's benefits
appeals).
This situation is not purely hypothetical, as the court's opinion in Yellow
88.
Book ofNY L.P. v. DiMilia, showed, when the court observed:
The plaintiff, by dint of its status as one of the most frequent collection
plaintiffs in Nassau County, is in a unique position of access to a
multitude of decisions concerning it, and-whether volitionally or due to
a faulty indexing system-has in the past presented to the court only
those of the multitude which were resolved in its favor, and not those
resolved against it.
729 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288 (Civ. Ct. 2001).
89.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1. 1 (2003).
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C. Ethical Directives, No Citation Rules, and Constitutional Considerations
Even when the jurisdiction has clearly prohibited the use of unpublished
opinions as authority, the duty to represent the client effectively may pose a
conflict for ethically-conscious counsel. Additionally, the issue of competent
representation may have constitutional implications in the operation of no citation
rules. If counsel is restrained in her reliance on an unpublished opinion that would
support an argument on behalf of the client, her compliance with the rule may
compromise the client's ability to receive a favorable determination at trial or on
appeal.
In Weatherford v. State, 90 an Arkansas criminal defendant convicted of
manufacturing methamphetamine challenged the jurisdiction's prohibition on
citing unpublished opinions in his direct appeal, arguing that the circumstantial
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The police had executed a
search warrant at Weatherford's residence based on information supplied by a
confidential informant. 9' The defendant was not at his residence at the time of the
search, and the search uncovered no evidence of manufacturing in process, no
methamphetamine, and no other drugs, cash, scales, records of transactions, or
weapons. The search did produce a number of items associated with the
manufacturing process that were otherwise lawful, including two items containing
methamphetamine residue. This physical evidence provided the basis for the
expert opinion offered by the State's chemist that manufacturing had taken place in
Weatherford's mobile home, although the expert could offer no specific time when
the "cooking" of the drug had occurred. The evidence also showed that
Weatherford had shared his residence with a nephew, Ray, in the weeks before the
search and that he had ordered the nephew to leave the day before the warrant was
obtained because Ray had failed to get a job. Ray had moved in with Weatherford
after being released from jail because his uncle offered to help him "get back on
his feet."
On appeal, Weatherford relied on Arkansas circumstantial evidence law
to argue that the State's evidence failed both to demonstrate that he had
manufactured methamphetamine and to disprove the reasonable hypothesis that
someone other than him, such as the nephew, could have been responsible for the
contraband seized at his home. 92 In support of his insufficiency argument,
Weatherford sought to rely on unpublished opinions of the Arkansas Court of
Appeals. His argument was based, in part, on the presence of factors in other cases
101 S.W.3d 227 (Ark. 2003).
90.
91.
The Arkansas Supreme Court's opinion addressed the legal issues presented
by Weatherford's motion for leave to cite unpublished opinions of the court of appeals. The
facts were developed in the subsequent opinion issued by the court of appeals. Weatherford
v. State, No. CACR02-415, 2003 WL 22451729, at *1-2 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2003)
92.
See Smith v. State, 988 S.W.3d 492 (Ark. 1999) (requiring prosecution's
evidence to "exclude every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with [accused's]
innocence"). Moreover, in a joint occupancy of premises case-where two or more persons
inhabit the same residence-the prosecution must offer evidence affirmatively linking the
accused to the contraband seized in the residence. Parette v. State, 786 S.W.2d 817, 822
(Ark. 1990) (State must prove that the accused exercised care, control and management over
the contraband and knew, in fact, that it was contraband).
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that resulted in affirmance, factors that were not present in his own case.93 He also
argued that the appellate94 court had reversed similarly weak circumstantial evidence
cases for insufficiency.

Because opinions resolving sufficiency attacks address factually
distinguishable scenarios and often do not require new statements of law that
would warrant publication, Weatherford argued that he should be permitted to rely
on unpublished decisions in this area. He specifically relied on the federal and state
constitutional guarantees to due process and effective assistance of counsel in
support of his argument for an exception to the state's no citation rule 95 under
these circumstances. The Arkansas Court of Appeals certified the question to the
state supreme court,9 6 which rejected all arguments in its published opinion and
remanded the case to the court of appeals for decision 98on the merits. 97 That court
affirmed, perhaps ironically, in an unpublished opinion.
Following affirmance in the state courts, the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 99 Because the Court has yet to consider the federal constitutional
claims raised in Weatherford, counsel may well consider asserting similar
arguments in other cases when court rules prevent reliance on unpublished
opinions in support of arguments at trial or on appeal.

93.

See Strom v. State, CACR00-137, 2001 WL 167822, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App.

Feb. 21, 2001) (explaining defendant had discussed manufacturing methamphetamine and
asked another individual to "cook up some dope" for him, then proceeded to manufacture
himself when other individual refused); Bolton v. State, No. CACROO-881, 2001 WL
577062, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. May 30, 2001) (affirming court based on evidence that the
defendant actually possessed methamphetamine); Dodson v. State, No. CACROO-1 160,
2001 WL 6153330, *3 (Ark. Ct. App. June 6, 2001) (noting defendant's wife testified that
he had "cooked" methamphetamine in a laboratory located in a trailer defendant had rented
and evidence established his joint occupancy of trailer);.
See Porter v. State, No. CACR 00-627, 2001 WL 56444, *3 (Ark. Ct. App.
94.
Jan. 24, 2001) (defendant not present in residence when searched, no drugs recovered and
no evidence he had control over or knowledge of contraband); Zajac v. State, No. CACR981236, 1999 WL 436283, *2 (Ark. Ct. App. June 23, 1999) (noting lack of fingerprint
evidence that would have established affirmative link between defendant and contraband).
95.
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 5-2(d) (providing that unpublished opinions of the court of
appeals are not to be published in the Arkansas Reports and "shall not be cited, quoted or
referred to by any court or in any argument, brief, or other materials presented to any court
(except in continuing or related litigation upon an issue such as res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or law of the case)."). The rule does not expressly limit reliance on unpublished
opinions issued by the supreme court, in contrast. Id.
Weatherford v. State, 101 S.W.3d 227, 228 (Ark. 2003). The Supreme Court
96.
asserted jurisdiction based on the certification of the case by the court of appeals pursuant to
Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(b)(6). Id.
97.
Id., 101 S.W.3d at 228-35.
Weatherford v. State, No. CACR02-415, 2003 WL 22451729 (Ark. Ct. App.
98.
Oct. 29, 2003).
Weatherford v. Arkansas, 124 S.Ct. 2187 (2004) (mem.).
99.
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1. The Due Process Claim
Weatherford's due process claim was predicated on the argument that
inconsistent application of state law is impermissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the prohibition on using unpublished opinions threatened an
inconsistent application of state law in his case. 00 Because Arkansas rules
prevented Weatherford from using unpublished court of appeals opinions to
discuss evidentiary sufficiency claims in methamphetamine manufacturing
prosecutions, review of his challenge could not be undertaken by the court with a
clear view of what constitutes sufficient evidence in that context. Federal due
process requires that a state criminal conviction be based on evidence sufficient to
prove each element of the offense charged.' 0' Weatherford argued that unless he
could fully argue relevant decisions addressing the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence adduced in manufacturing cases, he could not be assured of a proper
application of state law by the reviewing court.102
The Supreme Court has not addressed the due process problem in rules
prohibiting citation to unpublished opinions that may result in the inconsistent
application of law in factually similar cases. In fashioning his due process claim to
the court, Weatherford could not point to any Supreme Court authority directly on
03
point. Instead, he analogized to the Supreme Court's decisions in Fiore v. White
to support his approach. In Fiore, the Court had considered the proper application
of state law in resolving sufficiency challenges brought on appeal by codefendants
convicted of violating Pennsylvania's law prohibiting the operation of a hazardous
the evidentiary insufficiency6
waste facility without a permit.10 4 On direct appeal,
10 5
challenges resulted in opposite dispositions. Fiore's conviction was affirmed1
while his codefendant, Scarpone's, was reversed for insufficiency; 0 7 barring his

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also Jon A. Strongman, Comment,
100.
Unpublished Opinions, Precedent, and the Fifth Amendment: Why Denying Unpublished
Opinions Precedential Value is Unconstitutional, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 195, 211-15 (2001)
(arguing that due process protection requires recognition of precedential value of
unpublished opinions); Lance A. Wade, Note, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural
Due Process Argument Against Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial
Decisions, 42 B.C. L. REV. 695, 700-07 (2001) (same).
101.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979).
102.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-15, 124 S.Ct. 2187 (2004) (copy on file
with Author).
Fiore v. White (Fiore [), 528 U.S. 23 (1999) (Fiore 1). The Supreme Court
103.
revisited the Fiore case in 2001. Fiore v. White (Fiore 1), 531 U.S. 225 (2001) (FioreII).
104.
Fiore 1,528 U.S. at 24-25.
105.
The Court noted that Fiore appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, an intermediate appellate court, while Scarpone, his co-defendant, appealed
his conviction to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, an intermediate appellate court
having jurisdiction over regulatory criminal cases. Fiore 1,528 U.S. at 26-27.
Commonwealth v. Fiore, 563 A.2d 183 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). The state
106.
supreme court thereafter denied his application for leave to appeal to review the affirmance
by the intermediate court. Fiore 1, 528 U.S. at 26.
Scarpone v. Commonwealth, 596 A.2d 892, 895 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)
107.
affd, Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 634 A.2d 1109 (Pa. 1993).
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reprosecution.108 The resulting decisions demonstrated an inconsistent application
of law for the two co-defendants.
Fiore sought state post-conviction relief after his direct appeal was
concluded, citing the later decision reversing Scarpone's appeal.' °9 The
Pennsylvania Superior Court denied relief, based in part on the fact that Fiore's
appeal had been concluded before the state supreme court's ruling was issued in
Scarpone's case." ° Fiore then petitioned for federal habeas relief, initially
obtaining relief from the district court."'
1 12
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the order granting relief,
relying on the Supreme Court's prior decision in Wainwright v. Stone. 1 3 The
circuit court observed that "[w]hile the Court has concluded that some federal
constitutional decisions should apply retroactively (citations omitted), it has made
clear that state courts are under no constitutional obligation to apply their own
criminal decisions retroactively."' "4
Yet despite the holding of Wainwright v. Stone, the Supreme Court's
treatment of the "inconsistent application of state law" argument in the Fiore
litigation must cast doubt on the continuing viability of that holding.
The Supreme Court, in its first opinion issued in the Fiore litigation,
certified to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the question of whether the decision
in Scarpone constituted a new rule or new construction of state law, or was
consistent with prior state law.' '5 The state court's holding that Scarpone did not
reflect a new rule of law 1 6 led to the reversal of the Third Circuit's decision by the
Court in Fiore 11. 117 Because the state court explained that it had not announced a
"new rule" in construing the statute in Scarpone, the Court was able to avoid the
question of whether federal due process requires retroactive application of a new
construction of a state statute to cases already final at the time the new rule is
announced." 8 Thus, the Court dealt with the insufficiency/inconsistency argument
108.
A reversal for insufficient evidence constitutes an acquittal barring retrial.
Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
109.
Fiore 1, 528 U.S. at 27.
110.
Commonwealth v. Fiore, 665 A.2d at 1193.
IIl.
Fiore 1, 528 U.S. at 28.
112.
Fiore v. White, 149 F.3d 221, 223 (3rd Cir. 1998).
113.
414 U.S. 21, 23-24 (1973).
114.
Fiore, 149 F.3d at 224 (emphasis added). The circuit court also rejected
Fiore's reliance on Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1974), inwhich the Court
recognized a federal defendant's right to claim the benefit of a subsequent circuit decision
inconsistent with the decisions rendered in his case in a post-conviction action brought
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Third Circuit distinguished Davis, however, because the
holding there did not rest on constitutional grounds. 149 F.2d at 226.
115.
Fiore 1,528 U.S. at 29.
116.
Fiorev. White, 757 A.2d 842, 848-49 (Pa. 2000).
117.
Fiore 11, 531 U.S. at 228-29.
118.
The Court's rather complex formulation for retroactivity of its constitutional
criminal procedure interpretations provides that "new rules" are generally not retroactive
except as to cases in which error has been properly preserved and that are pending on direct
review at the time a new rule is announced. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
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in straightforward fashion, holding that the prosecution's failure to prove an
essential element of the case-Fiore's failure to possess the required permitrequired reversal of the conviction.' 19
Weatherford argued that Fiore !! required state courts to apply state law
consistently, at least with respect to the determination of what evidence is
sufficient to support convictions for criminal offenses. If Fiore 1 did not require
resolution of the conflict in applying state law in the two Pennsylvania
prosecutions, thus implicating the federal due process guarantee, the United States
20
Supreme Court would have lacked jurisdiction to intervene on Fiore's behalf.
Consequently, Weatherford's reliance by analogy on the Fiore litigation was based
on the simple notion that consistent application of state law is an essential
component of federal due process.
Fiore's significance lies in the link between consistent application of state
law and federal due process, precisely the proposition rejected in Wainwright v.
Stone. To the extent that Fiore II required consistent application of state criminal
law, the opinion casts doubt on the continuing viability of Wainwright v. Stone,
which held that the constitution does not require states to apply their criminal laws
retroactively. Were the problem of inconsistency simply treated as an abstract
matter, the continuing viability of Wainwright might not implicate due process
values. But the problem is not abstract, as Fiore demonstrates. The Court's
disposition of the claims raised in Fiore I and 11 hints at the link but fails to reach
the point of explicitly overruling Wainwright.
The inability of Weatherford to argue the relative evidentiary strengths of
cases requiring reversal or supporting affirmance on sufficiency challenges
arguably compromised his expectation for a fair application of Arkansas law. The
inconsistency in application of state law also is not purely theoretical. In a
subsequent methamphetamine manufacture case, Cooper v. State,12 1 a different
panel of the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed a conviction based upon failure to
prove an affirmative link between the accused and contraband in a joint occupancy
context. Police discovered a methamphetamine laboratory in a locked basement of
the house in which Cooper was arrested. The drug was being processed at the time
of the search. The police seized precursor chemicals, paraphernalia, and large
quantities of the finished product. Cooper was convicted, but the appellate court
reversed because there was no evidence that Cooper had a key to the basement

Apart from two rarely applied exceptions, new rules of constitutional criminal procedure are
otherwise not retroactive. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's conclusion that Scarpone correctly reflected existing law and did not announce a
new rule avoided consideration of the Teague "new rule" doctrine in Fiore's case.
Fiore 11, 531 U.S. at 228-29.
119.
Had there been no due process violation occasioned by conflicting
120.
interpretations of state law, the decisions of the state courts on matters of state law would
not have provided a basis for the exercise of the Court's certiorari jurisdiction. Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (finding a violation of state law insufficient for federal court
jurisdiction); Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983) (same).
121.
141 S.W.3d 7 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004).
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and, thus, no affirmative link despite the fact that he actually possessed
a small
122
quantity of methamphetamine at the time of his arrest in the residence.
The difficulty in reconciling Cooper'2 3 with Weatherford 24 illustrates the
problem posed by rules that restrict attorneys from incorporating opinions not
designated for publication in their arguments. Cooper simply applied Arkansas
joint occupancy and affirmative link evidence principles to facts arguably stronger
in demonstrating the defendant's culpability than those present in Weatherford, yet
different panels of the same court reached contrary results about the accused's
guilt in these cases. This suggests a due process violation under Fiore, although
not nearly as pristine because Fiore involved codefendants whose appeals reached
different results on the same set of facts.
The unresolved question is whether such inconsistencies can fairly be
hidden or suppressed by the application of no citation rules consistent with due
process. The denial of certiorari in Weatherford permitted the Supreme Court to
avoid resolution of the due process issue in criminal appeals. Neither has the Court
addressed the issue in the context of civil cases, although commentators have
noted that the Court has denied certiorari at least
twice in cases involving
25
challenges to the Seventh Circuit's no citation rule.'
2. Effective Assistance of Counsel
The second federal constitutional claim raised by Weatherford in his
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was predicated on the
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. 126 This theory is applicable only to
restrictions on the use of unpublished opinions in criminal cases as a matter of
Sixth Amendment law. Typically, ineffectiveness claims arise either in the context
of defective representation1 27 or as a result of improper representation because of
conflicting interests. 128 A third type of ineffectiveness claim arises when counsel's

122.
123.
124.
125.

Jd. at9-11.
Id.
No. CACR02-415, 2003 WL 22451729 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2003).
See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential

Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of

Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1180 n.74 (1978) (referring to denials of certiorari in
Do-Right Auto Sales v. U.S. Court of Appeals for Seventh Circuit, 429 U.S. 917 (1976) and
Bowder v. Director, Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978)). See also In re

Rules of U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit, Adopted Nov. 18, 1986, 955 F.2d 36, 38
(10th Cir. 1992) (Holloway, J., dissenting) (citing Seventh Circuit cases).
126.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
127.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (defining Sixth Amendment
violation in terms of defective performance of counsel that presents reasonable likelihood of

adverse effect to defendant).
128.
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (finding where conflict was
undisclosed prior to trial, defendant establishes ineffectiveness claim only upon showing

that the conflict adversely affected representation).
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performance is impaired by the operation of a rule29or ruling that compromises
counsel's ability to provide effective representation. 1
Weatherford relied on this third category of ineffective assistance, which
was recognized in Brooks v. Tennessee.130 There, the Court held that the operation
of a Tennessee procedural rule requiring that the accused testify first in the defense
case, if at all, compromised defense counsel's ability to evaluate the defense case
before advising the accused regarding his decision to testify or remain silent. The
Court recognized that as a matter of professional judgment counsel might want to
call the accused later, after evaluating the strength of its case. The Court observed
that "[t]he accused is thereby deprived of the
' 3 'guiding hand of counsel' in the
timing of this critical element of his defense."' '
Weatherford argued in his direct appeal that the no citation rule
effectively tied counsel's hands by prohibiting arguments based upon unpublished
opinions showing that the evidence was insufficient at his trial. The Arkansas
Supreme Court, however, upheld the no citation rule, concluding that it "in no way
restricts counsel from setting forth the facts of his own case and demonstrating that
they do not rise to the level of sufficient evidence."'' 32 The problem with this
analysis is, of course, that the primary method to argue evidentiary insufficiency is
to demonstrate other instances in which a court held comparable evidence
insufficient or in which a court has affirmed based on qualitatively or
quantitatively greater evidence.
Both constitutional claims raised in the Weatherford litigation focused on
counsel's ability to argue unpublished opinions on appeal. The same principles
apply to the restriction on trial counsel's reliance on unpublished opinions,
particularly with regard to arguing a motion for directed verdict in a criminal case.
129.
The Court has applied the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective
assistance to both the trial and appellate stages of litigation. In Penson v. Ohio, the Court
observed:
The need for forceful advocacy does not come to an abrupt halt as the
legal proceeding moves from the trial to appellate stage. Both stages of
the prosecution, although perhaps involving unique legal skills, require
careful advocacy to ensure that rights are not forgone and that substantial
legal and factual arguments are not inadvertently passed over.
488 U.S. 75, 85 (1988).
406 U.S. 605 (1972). Other instances of rules or rulings operating to impair
130.
counsel's performance are found in United States v. Gedes, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (stating
trial court's order for counsel not to consult with client during recess between client's direct
and cross-examination violated Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance) and Herring
v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 863-65 (1975) (stating that New York law permitting trial court
to dispense with closing argument in bench trial violates Sixth Amendment effective
assistance guarantee). Other decisions suggest a similar analysis. For instance, the
prohibition on impeaching one's witness was found to violate due process by infringing on
the right to fair trial in Chambers v.Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
131.
Brooks, 406 U.S. at 612-13. The state supreme court rejected Weatherford's
reliance on Brooks, holding that the decision actually primarily implicated the accused's
Fifth Amendment "right to choose whether or not to testify at trial." Weatherford v. State,
101 S.W.3d 227, 235 (Ark. 2003).
Weatherford, 101 S.W.3d at 235.
132.
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And the due process argument that courts must apply precedent consistently to
arrive at fair decisions has currency in civil, as well as criminal, cases. The press
for changes in no citation policy may ultimately lead the Supreme Court to
consider the constitutional implications of policies that limit reliance on
unpublished but available decisions.
Moreover, counsel should consider looking to state constitutional
protections to support citing unpublished opinions. While the Arkansas Supreme
Court rejected Weatherford's state constitutional due process' 33 and effective
assistance arguments, 3 4 similar arguments may prove successful in other states.
For instance, in Grand County v. Rogers, 35 the Utah Supreme Court relied on a
state constitutional provision' 36 vesting the judicial power in that court to abrogate
a no citation rule. The court held:
When the court of appeals renders a decision on an issue that
decision is automatically part of the law of this state, unless and
until contravened by this court, the legislature, or the people through
the processes authorized for the making of new law. For this reason,
decisions of the court of appeals expressed in a memorandum
decision or in an opinion, are equally binding upon lower courts of
this State, and may be cited to37the degree that they are useful,
authoritatively and persuasively.
Although the Grand County court did not expressly rest its decision on the
proposition that the state constitution prohibits no citation rules, it achieved the
same result by indirectly attacking the promulgation of the rule by an entity other
than the state supreme court. Counsel constrained by a similar prohibition should
consider the option of creatively attacking the no citation rule when necessary to
fully represent the interests of the client.

III. TRIAL COURT RELIANCE ON UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS
In jurisdictions that do not prohibit citing unpublished opinions as
authority, reliance on these decisions by trial counsel is not ethically constrained.
Trial courts should not refuse to consider unpublished decisions in ruling on
matters before them, even though the weight to be given an unpublished decision
may be less than a published decision in accord with the custom or rule of the
jurisdiction. An intermediate Texas appellate court, in characterizing the
limitations imposed by the no citation rule, observed:
By stating that unpublished opinions may be cited but have no
precedential value, we perceive the intent of the rule to be that a
court has no obligation to follow such opinions. The effect of the
rule is to afford parties more flexibility in pointing out such
opinions and the reasoning employed in them rather than simply
arguing, without reference, that same reasoning. However, the court
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Jd. at 234.
Id. at 227.
44 P.3d 734 (Utah 2002).
UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
Rogers, 44 P.3d at 738.
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to whom an unpublished opinion is cited has no obligation to follow
the opinion or to specifically distinguish such opinion. They may be
cited merely as an aid in developing reasoning that may be
employed by the reviewing court be it similar or different. Even so,
we do not view Rule 47.7, or the former rule, as justifying
unreasonedconsistency on the part of an appellatecourt.138
This approach recognizes the wisdom of permitting trial courts to consider
unpublished opinions to predict the likely disposition of the issue if it is argued on
appeal. However, the duty to disclose adverse unpublished authority in
jurisdictions permitting citation to unpublished opinions would also appear certain.
In jurisdictions in which unpublished opinions may not be cited as
authority, trial courts may nevertheless have an interest in considering these
opinions in ruling on issues presented in the pre-trial and trial process. 39 Trial
courts ignoring no citation rules in attempting to make correct judgments
demonstrates the importance of rules governing, and sometimes allowing, the
citation of unpublished opinions. While unpublished opinions may, by rule or
tradition, lack the precedential authority accorded published decisions, unless the
issuing courts have simply ruled incorrectly, 140 these opinions should be
considered correct in their expressions of law or application of law to facts.
Of course, the problem is that courts may err in their decisions. Courts
seldom candidly admit that their unpublished opinions may, in fact, be erroneous.
If they did, there would likely be a more rational basis for holding that such
decisions are not available for citation as precedent. In Goodlet v. State, a
Kentucky court rejected a claim that an affirmance in a criminal case should be
vacated based upon a subsequent contrary decision.' 4' But the court also noted:
Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to even identify the
inconsistent resolution of issues as neither appellate court has any
internal index of unpublished cases or any mechanism to retrieve
cases according to the legal issues involved. Certainly, the vast
majority of cases in this Court and those heard as a matter of right
by the Kentucky Supreme Court are resolved in unpublished
opinions. Goodlet is absohtely correct that the same issue under

Carrillo v. State, 98 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added)
138.
(citing to TEX. R.APP. P. 47 that provides, in pertinent part that unpublished opinions "have
no precedential value but may be cited with the notation, '(not designated for
publication)"') The prior rule had expressly prohibited citation to unpublished opinions "by
counsel or by a court." Id. at 793, n.3 (distinguishing the language of the former rule, TEX.
R. APP. P. 47.7).

The difficulty may lie in determining when a trial court has incorrectly
139.
considered an unpublished opinion. Unless the trial court expressly relies upon the case, an
appellate court is likely to conclude that the complaining party has not suffered prejudice
from the discussion of the case in the court below. See Merrill Lynch v. McCollum, 666
S.W.2d 604, 610 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
825 S.W.2d 290 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).
140.
Id.
141.

446

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 47:419

similarfacts can be decided in entirely different ways with no one
being the wiser. 142

Even assuming that appellate courts seldom err, this possibility exists, and the
ability to refer to an unpublished opinion as evidence of the correct expression of
law would appear important in a limited number of cases.
The trial court's predicament is reflected in the sequence of decisions
rendered by the Fifth Circuit in suits against the Dallas Area Rapid Transit
Authority. In an unpublished opinion, the circuit court concluded that the authority
was immune from suit as an entity of the State of Texas, and upheld the district
cour's dismissal of the action. 43 Within a year, a former employee brought a
discrimination action against the authority. This time, the circuit court reached a
different conclusion on the immunity question, effectively overruling the
previously unpublished opinion of the same court.14 The changing posture of the
court prompted Judge Smith, in dissent,145 to point out the frustration likely faced
by counsel for the authority who might reasonably have assumed that the client's
Eleventh Amendment immunity had been established in the prior litigation, only to
the frustration of the
find that a later panel would disagree. Moreover, he noted
46
lower courts in relying on the prior panel determination. 1
In a jurisdiction in which reference to unpublished opinions is not
permitted, the problem of enforcement of the rule arises, particularly when the trial
court's decision would otherwise be correct. If the trial court relies on an
unpublished opinion in its decisionmaking, the appellate court may be faced with
enforcing the rule against both the trial court and the prevailing litigant. In
Commonwealth v. Brezan,147 the Pennsylvania appellate court reversed the grant of
a new trial by a trial court based upon its review of the record; apparently, the trial
court had relied solely on an unpublished memorandum opinion. 148 But a problem
may arise in determining precisely when a trial court has improperly relied on an
unpublished opinion as "precedent" or "authority," leading the appellate court to

142.

Id. at 292 (emphasis added).

Anderson v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 180 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (per
143.
curiam) (table); see Strongman, supra note 100, at 212-13 (discussing DART litigation in
light of due process argument against no citation rules).
Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 242 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 2001).
144.
Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 260 F.3d 260, 261-63 (5th Cir. 2001)
145.
(Smith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 261. Judge Smith questioned the continuing viability of citation
146.
prohibition in light of the widespread availability of opinions that would formerly not have
been readily accessible in light of non-publication determinations. Id.
614 A.2d. 252 (Pa. Super. 1992).
147.
Id. at 253-54. The court distinguished prior decisions in which trial court
148.
rulings relying on unpublished opinions were upheld. However, in both Major v. Major, 518
A.2d 1267 (Pa. 1986), and Melendez v. Penn. Assigned Claims Plan, 557 A.2d 767 (Pa.
1989), the trial court decision could be predicated on grounds or authority independent of
the unpublished opinion. And in other cases in which unpublished opinions had been

considered, other authority existed to support the trial court ruling. Brezan, 614 A.2d at
247-48.
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conclude that no violation occurred. 4 9 And if the trial court's ruling was otherwise
correct, one may question the wisdom of punishing a litigant for relying on a
substantively correct, if procedurally flawed, decision by that court.
The following scenarios suggest acceptable uses of unpublished opinions
for purposes of trial court decisionmaking.
A. Consistent Principle of Law Applied by Appellate Courts
A trial court may justifiably be persuaded by an unpublished appellate
opinion when the opinion itself clearly identifies a rule or principle of law so basic
50
that it virtually forecloses any inconsistent ruling at the trial court level.
that
opinions
unpublished
Typically, the unpublished opinion appears in a series of
have expressed the rule or principle originally expressed in a published opinion of
some distant vintage. In such a case, the trial court's reliance on the more recent
unpublished opinion is appropriate in rejecting an argument that the established
rule or principle should be overruled or disregarded.
B. Inconsistent Expressions of Interpretation or Application of Law
In contrast to the situation in which an unpublished opinion discloses a
consistent interpretation or application of a rule or principle of law, unpublished
opinions often reflect a lack of consistency.' 5 ' This may result because a rule or
principle is actually unsettled, or more likely, because the proper interpretation or
application is inextricably linked to complex factual issues. This is most likely to

E.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce. Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. McCollum, 666 S.W.2d
149.
604, 610 (Tex. App. 1984) ("In the case before us, although unreported (and not to be
reported) case authority was cited, we find no evidence that the trial court in any way based
its decision or even considered the unreported cases cited.").
150.
In addressing an evidentiary sufficiency challenge in McBride v.
Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 165 (Va. App. 1997), the appellate court referred to an
unpublished decision of the state supreme court in Johnson v. Commonwealth, Record No.
940606 (Va. October 21, 1994). The court disposed of the claim that the circumstantial
evidence was insufficient, stating that "[t]he affirmance in Johnson clearly stands for the
proposition that circumstantial evidence, such as an assailant's statement that he possesses a
firearm, can be sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused
indeed possessed a firearm."
For example, in the unpublished opinion in Perez v. Johnson, the panel held
151.
that the petitioner's opposition to the motion for summary judgment filed by the State in this
federal habeas action was insufficient in failing to point with precision to evidence in the
record demonstrating a material issue of fact. No. 96-20135, slip op. at 2-3 (5th Cir. July
31, 1997). The petitioner argued that in light of the brevity of the record on appeal, the
panel's disposition was in direct conflict with numerous Fifth Circuit cases that hold that, at
least where a summary judgment record is not voluminous, a district court must consider the
record as a whole, even evidence upon which the nonmoving party failed to rely. Morgan v.
United States, 937 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing, e.g., Higgenbotham v. Ochsner
Foundation Hospital, 607 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1979)) (emphasis added); Nicholas Acoustics
& Specialty Co. v. H & M Constr. Co., 695 F.2d 839, 845-46 (5th Cir. 1983) (same); Keiser
v. Coliseum Properties, Inc., 614 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1980) (same). Petitioner's second
petition for rehearing, pointing directly to this apparent conflict in decisions, was denied,
however.
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occur with respect to rulings committed to the trial court's discretion that are
reversible only for abuse of discretion. Thus, the issue previously considered may
have been disposed of simply by notation that the trial court is vested with
discretion to make the ruling on the issue before the court. Nevertheless, the prior
determination may be valuable because of the similarity or dissimilarity to the
precise issue in the case that is currently before the trial court.' 52 Because the
application of such discretion is essentially not subject to rigid guidelines, the trial
court's intuitive assessment of the proper application of its discretion is most often
controlling in the ultimate disposition of the claim or case.
C. Expression on the Merits of Unpreserved Claims or Issues
A potentially valuable insight into the thinking of an appellate court may
be disclosed in an unpublished opinion when the court identifies an issue that has
not been properly preserved for appellate review at the trial court level. 53 The
identification of the issue may afford both trial counsel and the trial court an
appreciation for the potential significance of a similar preserved claim simply
because the appellate court has noted it in its unpreserved context in the prior
case. 154 Or the court may provide more information, indicating its probable ruling
152.
For example, in Carrillo v. State, the trial court noted that the holding in an
unpublished opinion offered in support of the defendant's motion to suppress was based on
distinguishable facts, such that the search warrant would likely be upheld on appeal if the
appellate court were to "apply that same reasoning" used by the court in the prior,
unpublished decision. Carrillo v. State, 98 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003). On
appeal, the same appellate court did hold that the two cases were factually distinguishable.
Id.
In State v. Hochrein, the court observed that "[n]either party raises the issue
153.
of whether Wisconsin recognizes a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction based
on no probable cause to stop. However, we may decide a constitutional question when, as
here, justice compels a decision and the facts are uncontested." 452 N.W.2d 587, 587 (Wis.

Ct. App. 1989). The court then held that an unlawful arrest does not deprive the trial court
ofjurisdiction over the defendant. Id.
154.
For example, in State v. Butler, the issue concerned a failure of preservation
of error that resulted in rejection of the criminal defendant's claim that he was entitled to
rely on a post-traumatic stress disorder defense based on his prior military action in
Vietnam. No. 95 CA 68, 1996 WL 354926, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 28, 1996). The
defendant attempted to raise his claim in an initial action for post-conviction relief,
however, the court dismissed based on its conclusion that the defendant could have raised
the issue on direct appeal, and, having failed to do so, had abandoned the claim. Id. at *2. In
a second petition, Butler claimed that counsel had been ineffective in failing to investigate
and raise the issue and preserve error for appellate review. Id. In response to the second
petition, the appellate court observed that "Butler argues that his counsel was ineffective
because he did not present evidence at trial that Butler suffered from post-traumatic stress
disorder. We appear to have invited this argument in our November 4, 1993, Decision and
Entry in State v. Butler, Clark App. No. 2634." Id. at *2 (emphasis added). Here, the
appellate court's reference to having "invited" the argument advanced in the second petition
for post-conviction relief reflects the alternative way in which the claim could have been
presented under state law. The reference in an unpublished opinion might be particularly
important in educating counsel in other cases of the proper way to assert similar claims, yet
the fact that both dispositions were unpublished might well deprive other litigants and their
counsel of the value of the explanation given.
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had the issue been properly preserved. In the latter case, the unpublished opinion
may give the trial court a sense of direction as to how the issue should be decided
in the first instance. In the former, the appellate court's reference to the
unpreserved issue at least signals its potential importance.
In each of these hypothetical situations, the trial court's reliance on an
unpublished opinion is designed to reach a correct result on the merits. The court
thus looks to any expression on the issue or claim by an appellate court in a prior
proceeding, even though the appellate court did not decide the issue in a published
opinion serving as precedent, or in fact, decide it at all. If the trial court correctly
interprets the prior opinion or opinions, its ruling will more likely be correct,
resulting in affirmance on appeal or, alternatively, a more clearly developed
resolution of the issue once the parties have fully litigated it at trial.
Of course, proponents of no citation rules may not find trial court reliance
on unpublished decisions to reach correct decisions persuasive. In In re Donald
R.,' 55 for instance, the Illinois appellate court criticized trial court reliance on
unpublished opinions for guidance in decisionmaking:
We appreciate the fact that trial judges do not like to be reversed by
the appellate court. Nonetheless, the fear of reversal does not justify
reliance on an unpublished order. The rationale should be obvious.
How does an attorney represent his client when the trial court bases
its decision on "authority" of which the trial attorneys are totally
unaware or on which, even if they are aware, they cannot rely? The
bar and the public have some serious and sometimes legitimate
concerns over abuses and injustices, either real or perceived,
associated with disposing of cases by unpublished orders. Based on
trial court records we have reviewed, we are troubled by the
increasing frequency of trial courts relying on unpublished Rule 23
therefore take this opportunity to condemn the
orders and
56
practice. 1
The Illinois court points to a problem created by the use of unpublished
opinions and orders in the disposition of cases. 15 7 But it is a problem not resolved

155.
156.

796 N.E.2d 670 (11.Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 676 (emphasis added). The court continued:
[W]e feel it important here to note that the trial judge erred when he
stated he was bound in this case by a previous unpublished order from
another case. We do so because we are seeing this with some regularity.
There is nothing ambiguous about Supreme Court Rule 23(e), which
provides that an unpublished order of the appellate court is not
precedential. 166 1ll.2d R. 23(e). It is error for a trial court to rely on an
unpublished order of the appellate court other than in those cases
involving double jeopardy, res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the
case.

Id.
Illinois is now in the process of reconsidering its no citation rule. In February
157.
2003, The Illinois Supreme Court appointed a committee to study its no-citation rule. See
Barnett, Battlefield Report, supra note 5, at 480 n.46. The court is expected to take action on
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by secrecy. Trial judges may "fear" reversal, but perhaps for the very laudable
reason that they struggle to make correct decisions. And that is precisely what
furthers the goal of justice, at least theoretically in our system-the process by
which trial courts make correct decisions because they understand the proper rules
of law and their application. Instead of opting for secrecy, the court might better
have understood the desire of trial judges and attorneys to have access to the law
so that clients can be properly advised and cases properly decided. Rather than
limiting or restricting access to the reasoning of the appellate courts, a preferable
policy would be to opt for disclosure.
Accuracy in trial court decisionmaking is desirable because it promotes
fairness in the litigation process. When issues are contested in the trial court, the
role of counsel as advocate for the disposition favoring the client becomes critical.
Disparity in ability, intuition, preparation, and resources may all serve to
compromise counsel's performance. To a significant extent, a true "leveling of the
field," in terms of counsel's abilities, can never be ensured. But when the field is
skewed because of disparity in resources, there is a justification for engaging in
some leveling through rules governing the litigation process. In the past, the
disparity in access to unpublished opinions has influenced many courts to adopt
rules prohibiting reliance on these opinions.
The prohibition on use of unpublished opinions artificially compromises
counsel's ability to represent the client. In order to ensure a more level playing
field, the adoption of a rule that both permits reliance on prior judicial expressions
on an issue and ensures that all parties will have access to these expressions would
advance the quality of representation and accuracy of decisionmaking. This is
particularly true at the trial court level precisely because the judicial thinking that
goes into creation of an unpublished opinion may well be beyond the scope of the
trial judge's reference, while appellate judges who have participated in
decisionmaking resulting in unpublished opinions are more likely aware of what
their courts have done.
The solution to the problem of disparity of access, or even lack of
thoroughness on the part of counsel that might account for an incorrect or unfair
decision by the trial court, lies in a policy of disclosure that guarantees access to
the bases upon which the trial court will make its decisions. Disclosure
requirements typically serve these different and very important interests in the
litigation process. Thus, for example, some jurisdictions have adopted mandatory
disclosure of information in the pre-trial process. 58 This approach may actually
penalize parties who retain counsel superior in terms of natural abilities or
diligence in some instances, yet promotes other important interests, such as
avoiding unfair dispositions and furthering the settlement process.
a proposal to permit unpublished opinions to be cited as persuasive authority in 2005. See
Serfass & Cranford, supra note 10, at 349-50 n.5 and accompanying text.
158.
E.g., Colorado rules provide for a mandatory "Trial Management Order"
requiring the parties to identify specific information relating to their claims and defenses,
proposed witnesses and anticipated evidence supporting those claims or defenses, a detailed
list of exhibits, and provide information for inclusion injuror notebooks no later than thirty
days prior to a scheduled trial date. CoLO. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(3).
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Lack of access to unpublished opinions can compromise fairness in the
litigation process. In order to assure that the disparity does not jeopardize the
integrity of the process, the trial court should impose some limitations on the use
of unpublished decisions. The limitations should afford notice that an unpublished
decision will be offered as authority; permit reasonable opportunity for responsive
research and briefing; and authorize interlocutory appeal on the motion of either
party or the trial court, sua sponte,159 when good cause demonstrates the need for
immediate resolution of the issue before the trial court. Consistent rules
liberalizing the use of unpublished opinions will lead to more predictability in trial
and appellate proceedings and increase overall fairness throughout the litigation
process. Adoption of a formal rule would ensure that the use of unpublished
opinions would operate uniformly within the jurisdiction's trial courts. The
comprehensive procedural scheme might include the following proposed rules and
provisions.

IV. A PROPOSED RULE THAT WOULD ALLOW ATTORNEYS TO
RELY ON UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL
Appellate courts or state legislatures addressing the continuing debate
over prohibition to citation to opinions not designated for publication should
consider the implications of any policy initiative that changes the rules of practice
in the jurisdiction. Adoption of a policy favoring citation to all opinions issued by
the appellate courts will necessarily include implications for appellate courts
accustomed to using the publication decision as a means of deemphasizing
dispositions in significant numbers of cases. Consequently, the determination that
such a move is either necessary or desirable should rest on consideration of
potential consequences for judges, counsel and litigants in future cases. The rules
proposed here address a number of concerns likely to arise in any jurisdiction
contemplating a change in citation policy.
RULE

xx:

RELIANCE ON UNPUBLISHED APPELLATE OPINIONS IN
THE TRIAL COURT

(a) A party may rely on an unpublished opinion or
opinions issued by an appellate court of this jurisdiction in
conformity with the requirements of this rule.
(b) When a party seeks to rely on an unpublished opinion
or opinions of an appellate court as authority supporting a position
advocated before the trial court, the party must disclose the
unpublished opinion or opinions to the trial court and opposing
party when briefing a motion or objection, or at such time as
appropriate during the proceedings. The party relying on such
opinion or opinions shall file a supporting brief bearing counsel's
signature explaining the relevance of the unpublished opinion or
opinions and containing counsel's affirmance that there is no known
published opinion controlling the disposition of the issue.

159.
See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. I IOA, 308 (2005) (permitting the trial
court to seek an interlocutory appeal on its "own motion or motion of any party").
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(c) When a party is served with notice of opposing party's
intent to rely on an unpublished opinion or opinions in support of a
position taken before the trial court, that party shall be afforded an
adequate opportunity to research and brief the issue in light of
supporting unpublished decisions advanced by opposing counsel.
Comment. This rule is designed to set forth the parameters of
counsel's duties in raising an issue relying on unpublished
decisions, or when counsel intends to rely on unpublished opinions
in support of a claim, motion, or objection. The goal of the rule is
not only to promote accuracy in the trial court's decisionmaking, but
also to avoid unfair prejudice in the use of unpublished decisions
based on disparity of resources among the parties. The rule
contemplates mandatory disclosure of contrary authority and
sufficient opportunity for research and counter-briefing to avoid
domination of the proceedings by a party having substantially
greater resources or failing to faithfully apprise the trial court of the
true state of law upon which it is relying.16

RULE XXI. INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

(a) When, on motion of either party, or on its own motion,
the trial court is of the opinion that the unpublished opinion or
opinions relied upon by a party or the parties raises an important
issue regarding a controlling principle or rule of law that will
expedite disposition of the issue prior to final resolution of the case,
the trial court may certify the issue to the appellate court for
interlocutory appeal.1 6 1 In certifying the issue for interlocutory
appeal, the trial court must:
(1) Identify precisely the issue before the court;
(2) Make findings of fact regarding those facts
essential to disposition of the legal issue in the case; and
(3) Identify the unpublished opinion, or opinions,
which the trial court has found to bear on the proper
disposition of the issue.
(b) When the trial court's decision to certify an issue for
interlocutory appeal is based on a perceived conflict between two or

160.

Some state rules already provide for disclosure as an express predicate to

reliance. See, e.g., U.S. CT. OF APe. 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 14(b)(vi)(4); MICH.
CT. R. 7.215(C);.
161.
For example, in considering whether a discovery order was appealable, the
Illinois court distinguished between discovery issues regarding scope of discovery and
questions of law regarding particular discovery, noting: "'Questions of law are reviewable
under Rule 308, whereas discovery orders are not." Szczeblewski v. Gossett, 795 N.E.2d
368, 369 (11. Ct. App. 2003). The court permitted the appeal in reviewing the proper use of
requests for admissions and a party's duty to "avail himself of the knowledge of his
attorneys or agents before admitting, denying or making a claim of insufficient knowledge
to admit or deny a request to admit." Id. at 371.
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more unpublished decisions of the appellate courts, the trial court
shall identify with specificity the decisions found to be in conflict
and order that the record on appeal include copies of the
unpublished opinions relied upon in making the conflict decision.
The trial court shall also indicate in its order certifying the question
that no published decisions have been located controlling the
disposition of the question or issue presented.
(c) When the trial court's decision to certify an issue for
interlocutory appeal is based upon a perceived conflict between a
published opinion of the appellate court and more recent
unpublished decision or decisions of the appellate courts casting
doubt on the continuing viability of the published precedent, the
trial court shall state with specificity in its order the grounds
demonstrating good cause for immediate challenge to the published
precedent as a result of subsequent, unpublished decisions. The
following grounds may demonstrate such good cause:
(1) That the published precedent is of sufficient age
that it has generally been abandoned in substance in other
jurisdictions, but has not been directly called into question
before the highest court of this jurisdiction.
(2) That subsequent unpublished decisions of the
intermediate court or courts of appeals have uniformly
questioned the continuing viability of the published
precedent, while deferring to the rule as precedent.
(3) That subsequent unpublished decisions of the
supreme court have questioned the continuing viability of
the published decision, as controlling precedent, but have
not expressly overruled the prior rule for a specific
procedural reason, such as failure of a party to properly
preserve error; a finding that the error predicated on the
published decision would have been harmless and not
required reversal; or that relief had been granted on
another claim presented not requiring the court to reach the
question presented.
Comment. The provisions of Rule xxi are designed to ensure that
interlocutory appeal is reserved for conflicts implicated by
unpublished opinions of sufficient significance that they justify
departing from the usual rules of finality. Recognizing that interests
of judicial economy and costs of litigation to the parties may
compromise the values of the litigation system, the use of
interlocutory appeals may help to avoid incorrect decisions in the
trial court and thus prevent the need for reversal and retrial, or may
prevent negotiated settlements premised on incorrect assessments of
the law. Interlocutory appeal should not be used by parties seeking
to delay the course of litigation, or by trial courts anticipating that
the process will result in parties being forced into settlement,
avoiding the time involved in litigation.
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Subsection (a) requires a detailed explanation of the issue and
source of conflict forming the basis for the interlocutory appeal.' 62
This is designed to ensure that the appeal is narrowly limited to the
question or issue of law and not to afford the litigants an opportunity
to argue the case on the merits or expand the appeal to include other
issues once the appeal is certified and accepted by the appellate
to properly define the issue for
court. 163 Where the trial court fails
164
review, dismissal is appropriate.
Subsection (b) requires the trial court to ensure that the unpublished
decisions are readily available to the appellate court upon docketing
the appeal and provides a mechanism for inducing the trial court and
parties to determine that no published decision controlling the
disposition in the jurisdiction has been overlooked or ignored in the
process.
Subsection (c) addresses those situations in which the trial court
concludes that more recent, unpublished decisions of an appellate
court have substantially eroded the continuing authority of an older,
published decision that serves as precedent in deciding a claim,
issue, or question before the trial court. This provision should
discourage trial courts from proceeding with certification based
upon simple disagreement with existing precedent, while setting
forth grounds showing good cause for certifying a question or issue
when appropriate.

The Illinois interlocutory appeal rule provides:
When the trial court, in making an interlocutory order not otherwise
appealable, finds that the order involves a question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
intermediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation, the court shall so state in writing,
identifying the question of law involved. Such a statement may be made
at the time of the entry of the order or thereafter on the court's own
motion or on motion of any party. The Appellate Court may thereupon in
its discretion allow an appeal from the order.
ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. I 10A, 1 308. See also ALA. R. APP. PROC. 5(a) (providing "[tihe trial
judge must include in the certification a statement of the controlling question of law")
163.
The Supreme Court of Alabama has observed that the interlocutory appeal
process contemplated by its appellate rule 5 specifically requires the trial court to identify
the controlling issue of law to preclude review on a permissive appeal "beyond the
questions stated by the trial court," noting that any such expansion would "usurp the
responsibility entrusted to the trial court by Rule 5(a)." BE & K, Inc. v. Baker, 875 So. 2d
1185, 1188-89 (Ala. 2003) (construing ALA. R. APP. P. 5.).
See, e.g., Mason v. Water Resources International,694 P.2d 388, 389 (Haw.
164.
1985) (where trial court's certification of interlocutory appeal failed to identify the trial
court's basis for concluding that interlocutory appeal would result in more speedy
termination of litigation, the order failed to demonstrate the propriety of interlocutory
162.

appeal, as required by statute,

HAWAI'I REV. STAT.

§ 64 1-1(b)).
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RULE XXII. JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURTS ON
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

(a) An interlocutory appeal based solely on a perceived
conflict in the prior decisions of the court of appeals shall be taken
to the court of appeals.
(b) An interlocutory appeal taken pursuant to the
provisions of Rule xxi shall be taken to the supreme court. The court
of appeals shall have no jurisdiction to overrule a published opinion
of the supreme court, but unpublished decisions of the court of
appeals in conflict with a published opinion of the supreme court
shall demonstrate good cause for certifying the question to the
supreme court for interlocutory appeal.
Comment. The jurisdiction of the appellate courts is defined in this
section. In a jurisdiction having no intermediate appellate court, the
rule would be modified to refer only to the interlocutory appellate
process in the supreme court.
Subsection (b) notes the typical rule that an intermediate appellate
court is bound by decisions of the supreme court, but recognizes that
unpublished opinions of the intermediate court may legitimately call
into question the continuing viability of a decision of the highest
court in the jurisdiction.
RULE XXiII. ACTION TAKEN ON CERTIFICATION MOTION

(a) Whenever a trial court shall certify an issue for
interlocutory appeal to the supreme court or court of appeals, as
provided for in the preceding rules, the responding court shall enter
its order granting or denying interlocutory appeal as expeditiously
as feasible.
(b) When the interlocutory appeal is granted by either the
supreme court or court of appeals, the appeal shall proceed on the
record as in other interlocutory appeals permitted by law in this
jurisdiction. All formal proceedings in the trial court shall be stayed
pending disposition of the interlocutory appeal.
(c) When the interlocutory appeal is denied, the order
denying interlocutory appeal shall be returned to the trial court
immediately, which shall proceed with disposition of the case
forthwith.
(d) No motion on the merits of the grant or denial of
interlocutory appeal shall be entertained by the appellate courts
except on a motion to dismiss interlocutory appeal filed in or
granted by the court of appeals when that court lacks jurisdiction
over the interlocutory appeal, as provided for in these rules. In the
event the supreme court finds that a motion to dismiss an
application for interlocutory appeal or order granting interlocutory
appeal by the court of appeals has not been brought by a party in
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good faith, the supreme court may order sanctions against the party
moving to dismiss the interlocutory appeal.
Comment. Rule xxiii addresses the process for disposition of the
claim, issue or question certified by the trial court based upon an
unpublished opinion or opinions issued by the appellate court.
Subsection (a) provides for expeditious consideration of the trial
court's certification request.
Subsection (b) directs that the interlocutory appeal should follow
pre-existing interlocutory appeal processes already in place. If no
previously established interlocutory appeal process exists to guide
the appellate courts and parties in the litigation process, a specific
procedure should be created, although reference to general appellate
process noted in subsection (b) may be adequate to address this
alternative situation.
Subsections (c) and (d) address the need to avoid unnecessary delay
in the litigation process that may result when interlocutory appeals
165
are improvidently sought or granted by appellate courts.
Subsection (c) directs the trial court to proceed forthwith by
returning the case to the docket when its certification order is
rejected by the appellate courts. Subsection (d) provides for
sanctions in limited circumstances when a party seeks interlocutory
review on frivolous grounds or for purposes of delay or harassment.

RULE XXIV. DISPOSITION OF THE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL ON

THE MERITS

(a) A disposition on the certified question entered by the
court of appeals shall be reviewable in the supreme court on petition
for review. The supreme court may grant the petition and review the
disposition on the merits; vacate the disposition of the court of
appeals and remand for further proceedings in that court; or vacate
the disposition of the court of appeals and remand the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.
(b) A disposition entered by the supreme court on
interlocutory appeal shall be deemed the law of the case on the
precise legal issue presented by the interlocutory appeal. A
disposition entered by the court of appeals on the question presented
by the interlocutory appeal and not previously reviewed by the
supreme court shall be reviewable by the supreme court on
discretionary review of an opinion issued by the court of appeals in
the direct appeal of the entire case on the merits.

165.
As the Hawai'i Supreme Court observed in Mason v. Water Resources
International, increasing appellate caseloads demands that courts limit appeals from nonfinal orders in order to maintain current dockets and dispose of appeals in timely fashion.
694 P.2d at 389.
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Comment. The provisions of Rule xxiv define the jurisdictional
authority of the court of appeals and supreme court when a decision
on the merits of the interlocutory appeal has been reached.
Subsection (a) permits a party to seek immediate review in the
supreme court of an adverse decision on the interlocutory appeal.
Subsection (b) permits the party to reurge the issue on petition for
discretionary review if the supreme court previously refused to
review the court of appeals' decision on the merits. Failure to seek
immediate review of an adverse ruling of the court of appeals would
appear to bar later review in the supreme court. However,
foreclosing review by rule may not be appropriate since the court of
appeals decision may be subject to additional review in light of the
full record of trial, altering the accuracy of its ruling on the legal
issue when initially presented. Thus, either party may be aggrieved
by application of the court of appeals ruling when applied on the
record of trial and arguably, should be afforded the option of
challenging that disposition in light of a more complete record. This
would require a party not challenging an adverse decision of the
intermediate court by seeking immediate review in the supreme
court to fully explain why that court's ruling was incorrect or
prejudicially applied when relied upon by the trial court in its
disposition of the claim, issue or question during the course of the
subsequent proceedings in that court.
CONCLUSIONS
The proposed rules are designed to bring uniformity to the use of
unpublished opinions in trial courts. Attorneys will almost certainly be tempted to
use whatever authority supports their clients' positions in the trial process, even
when court opinions may be formally excluded from argument by rule. Arguably,
an attorney's duty to represent the client competently may require counsel to make
a good faith search of unpublished opinions to find support for a position when
there is no controlling precedent in the jurisdiction; the courts have effectively
undermined existing precedent by other developments within the jurisdiction's
own case law; when developments in other jurisdictions have undermined
precedent; or when an unpublished opinion calls into question a formerly "settled
rule" in the jurisdiction. Whether counsel is ethically bound to disclose known, but
contrary, unpublished authority having no formal precedential value would appear
to depend on the proper construction to be given to the application of Model Rule
3.3 to such situations. The proper allocation of any burden might depend on
counsel's attempt to use unpublished opinions in support of a claim or issue.
The use of unpublished opinions is likely to grow, especially in light of
courts' increasing caseloads and decisions. Unpublished opinions may have
precedential value depending upon the position taken by the jurisdiction's
appellate courts, or ultimately, by a decision of the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court could follow Judge Arnold's Article [If reasoning with regard
to federal decisions and hold that federal courts may not disregard unpublished
opinions as non-precedential and may not limit their citation in subsequent
litigation. Or it could hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
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requires recognition of all prior dispositions as having precedential value in federal
court proceedings without extending that protection to state court matters.
Alternatively, the Court might extend this approach to hold that either the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause precludes no citation rules in state
proceedings, or that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
requires courts to consider unpublished decisions relied upon by federal and state
66
defendants only in the context of criminal prosecutions.
The issue of publication, as opposed to citation policies, is clouded by the
online "publication" of decisions that previously would not have been released in
reporter advance sheets. Courts and online databases disseminate unpublished
decisions, making them readily available but adding costs to the litigation process.
No citation rules may fall nationally under a consensus that courts should not
exclude these decisions from the "law" upon which litigants may rely. Absent a
definitive constitutional ruling on their availability, jurisdictions will remain
relatively free to fashion their own rules defining the role of all decisions as
precedent.
To the extent that non-publication is undermined by the fact that courts
now routinely post their decisions on judicial websites, regardless of their
designation as for or not for publication, this does not ensure ready access unless
the court also provides an engine for searching the opinions. Counsel may have
access to an unpublished decision by the style or number of the case, but may have
no means to find relevant decisions. Further, making unpublished decisions
available in online databases, whether on judicial websites or online providers, will
never provide an exhaustive or comprehensive database unless these sources
include all unpublished opinions. To the extent that they do not, there is likely to
be real uncertainty as to whether counsel can ascertain what the appellate courts
have held in their unpublished dispositions. If courts do abandon no citation rules
but continue to issue unpublished opinions, it is likely that they will employ rating
schemes with respect to the precedential value given to such opinions,
distinguishing between published decisions serving as binding precedent,
controlling precedent, or precedent, and those usable only as persuasive authority.
This will require counsel to judge the comparative significance of some precedents
established through publication and contrary holdings having only persuasive
value as a result of their status as being unpublished, even though they are being
generally disseminated.
Trial judges are rightfully interested in correctly ruling on issues raised in
the course of litigation and in avoiding reversal on appeal. They can hardly be
expected to ignore appellate opinions that explain rules or principles, particularly
when characterized by well-reasoned or factually similar contexts. Thus, trial
judges will be tempted to look at the authorities submitted by counsel in support of
their positions. Only express prohibitions on the use of unpublished decisions
would lead trial courts to refuse to review these expressions of higher courts on an
issue. And counsel can hardly be expected to ignore what would prove controlling,
persuasive, or favorable authority if the appellate court had designated its opinion
166.
See Weatherford v. State, 101 S.W.3d 227 (Ark. 2003); supra notes 91-135
and accompanying text.
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for publication. Consequently, a new regime for the use of these sources of
precedent may prove significant for ensuring fairness in the pre-trial, trial, and
settlement processes. The problems posed by the digital dissemination of case law,
effectively blurring the distinction between published and unpublished opinions,
necessitates clear and uniform rules that permit attorneys to cite unpublished
opinions when the integrity of the justice system demands. The rule proposed in
this Article would effect such a change and increase consistency and predictability
in trial and appellate proceedings.

